Pamphlet  No.  47 
Series  1927-28 
December,  1927 


Soviet  Russia 

After  Ten  Years 

DISCUSSED  BY 

James  G.  McDonald 
Stuart  Chase 

Rev.  Edmund  A.  Walsh 


A  STENOGRAPHIC  REPORT  OF  THE 

99th  New  York  Luncheon  Discussion 

November  19,  1927 
of  the 

Foreign  Policy  Association 

NATIONAL  HEADQUARTERS 
Eighteen  East  Forty-First  Street 
New  York  City 


Speakers: 


james  g.  McDonald 

Chairman,  National  Executive  Board,  Foreign  Policy  Association. 

Visited  Russia  this  summer. 


STUART  CHASE 

Director  of  the  Labor  Bureau,  Inc.;  member,  unofficial  Trade  Union 
Delegation  to  the  Soviet  Union,  1927 ;  author  of  The  Tragedy 
of  Waste;  co-author  of  Your  Money’s  Worth. 


REV.  EDMUND  A.  WALSH 

Regent,  School  of  Foreign  Service,  Georgetown  University; 
director  general,  Papal  Relief  Mission  to  Russia. 

HENRY  GODDARD  LEACH,  Chairman 


S  P  E  A  K  E 

Silas  B.  Axtell 
Hon.  Boris  A.  Bakhmeteff 
S.  G.  Bron 
Raymond  L.  Buell 
Stuart  Chase 
Col.  Hugh  L.  Cooper 
Mr.  Zyrio  J.  Lambkin 
M.  G.  Gurevitch 
Maj.  Gen.  William  N.  Haskell 
Morgan  Jones 
Henry  Goddard  Leach 
Ivy  L.  Lee 
A.  A.  Linde 

Rev.  Edmund 


S’  TABLE 

Lester  Markel 
Herbert  L.  May 

Mrs.  Anne  O’Hare  McCormick 
James  G.  McDonald 
Edgerton  Parsons 
William  Paton 
C.  A.  Richards 
Geroid  Robinson 
Hugo  Schmidt 
Boris  E.  Skvirsky 
Charles  E.  Stuart 
Prof.  Rexford  G.  Tugwell 
Miss  Lillian  D.  Wald 
,  Walsh 


Soviet  Russia 

After  Ten  Years 


DR.  HENRY  GODDARD  LEACH,  Chairman 


THE  subject  this  afternoon  is  Russia.  I  have  not  yet  found  out  why 
I  was  picked  out  for  Toastmaster.  As  far  as  I  can  learn  by 
inquiry  I  am  the  only  man  at  this  table  who  has  never  visited 
Russia.  I  am  one  of  those  Americans,  and  there  are  thousands  of  others, 
who  have  occupied  a  very  passive  position  during  the  past  ten  years, 
who  love  all  Russians,  but  who  make  very  little  effort  to  try  to  com¬ 
prehend  them.  My  formula  is  that  every  average  Russian  has  reaches 
of  the  imagination  which  the  methodical  American  intellect  finds  it 
impossible  to  explore.  You  might  as  well  fathom  the  depths  of  Einstein’s 
equations  proving  relativity. 

The  first  speaker  this  afternoon  has  been  a  familiar  figure  in  past  years 
on  this  platform.  It  is  a  very  fine  revenge  for  most  of  us,  I  am  sure,  to 
see  him  acting  today  not  as  the  arbitrary  judge  but  as  a  humble  occupant 
of  the  witness  box.  Mr.  McDonald  comes  to  us  with  his  title  of  Chair¬ 
man  of  the  Foreign  Policy  Association  and  all  his  titles  from  his  instruc- 
torship  at  Harvard,  but  with  new  titles  from  Russia,  I  suppose,  be¬ 
cause  he  has  spent  his  last  vacation  there. 

We  are  going  to  ask  him  to  tell  us  in  thirty  minutes — we  are  going  to 
be  rigorous  and  take  our  revenge,  holding  him  within  the  exact  seconds 
— to  tell  us  everything  he  has  learned  in  Russia  during  the  past  year. 


MR.  JAMES  G.  MCDONALD 

IT  IS  presumptuous  for  me  to  talk  about  Russia.  I  do  not  speak  the 
language,  nor  do  the  two  friends  with  whom  I  traveled.  I  was 
there  but  three  weeks.  And,  as  it  was  my  first  visit,  I  had  no  pre¬ 
vious  experience  to  use  as  a  standard. 

The  language  obstacle  we  tried  to  overcome  by  frequent  use  of  Ger¬ 
man  and  French,  and  by  speaking  through  our  interpreter,  whom  we 
had  every  reason  to  trust.  Nearly  every  day  was  filled  with  appoint¬ 
ments — either  with  government  officials  or  with  foreigners.  Among  the 
latter  were  men  and  women  of  the  most  diverse  points  of  view  in  ref¬ 
erence  to  actual  conditions  in  Russia.  Moreover,  I  had  had,  in  one  sense, 
an  unusual  preparation  for  my  study.  During  the  previous  nine  years, 
I  had  presided  over  scores  of  discussions  of  the  Russian  problem,  at 
which  every  important  opinion  or  impression  had  been  vigorously  attacked 
and  as  vigorously  defended. 


3 


Despite  my  obvious  handicaps,  I  was  able  to  gain  many  extremely 
vivid  impressions.  Some  of  these  I  am  venturing  to  give  you  today. 
When  I  first  came  out  of  Russia,  I  thought  they  might  be  worth  a  little 
consideration,  particularly  since  they  represented  in  most  essentials 
rather  sharp  modifications  of  the  opinions  and  prejudices  which  I  took 
into  Russia.  But  now  I  am  not  so  sure  that  anything  I  have  to  say  is 
worth  listening  to.  Within  the  first  two  weeks  after  I  crossed  the  Russian 
frontier  into  Poland,  on  my  way  to  Geneva,  I  heard  “confidential  re¬ 
ports”  from  “highly  authoritative  sources”  which  belied  everything  I 
had  seen  or  thought  I  had  seen,  and  everything  I  had  learned  or  thought 
I  had  learned.  Hence,  if  you  wish  to  know  the  truth  about  Russia,  I 
offer  this  advice :  Listen  carefully  to  what  I  have  to  say,  and  believe 
the  opposite. 

As  a  result  of  my  observations,  I  either  modified  or  completely  changed 
many  of  my  earlier  views.  The  Government  is  not,  as  I  had  been  led 
to  believe,  freeing  itself  in  any  perceptible  degree  from  the  control  of 
the  Communist  Party.  The  Russian  Union  of  Socialist  Soviet  Re¬ 
publics  is  at  once  more  federal  and  more  centralized  than  I  had  expected. 
The  drift  to  the  Right  is  much  less  certainly  defined  than  most  returning 
business  men  tell  us.  The  foreign  policy  of  the  Government  is  more 
peaceful,  and  that  of  other  organizations  in  Russia  more  provocative  than 
I  had  thought.  The  Communist  Party  is  not  a  party  in  our  sense  of  the 
word;  it  is  a  sect.  The  motivation  of  the  movement  is  not  fundamentally 
economic,  as  most  of  us  believe, — it  is  inherently  religious.  A  promis¬ 
ing  result  of  the  Revolution  is  that  which  is  rarely  noticed  and  almost 
never  reported — the  rebirth  of  individualism.  The  danger  of  a  split 
is  being  grossly  exaggerated  abroad.  I  thought  the  ruling  classes  in 
Russia  talked  only  politics;  I  found  them  concerned  much  more  about 
the  rationalization  and  expansion  of  industry.  Some  of  the  worst  and 
some  of  the  best  in  present-day  Russia  is  not  Bolshevist,  but  merely 
Russian ;  old  virtues  and  old  vices  with  new  names.  The  terror  is  not 
academic — it  is  very  real.  More  far  reaching  than  the  dispossession  and 
the  terrorization  of  the  old  regime  classes  is  the  tragic  cleavage  between 
the  old  and  the  young  throughout  all  Russia.  It  is  not  certain,  as  so 
many  of  us  have  assumed,  that  financial  assistance  and  diplomatic  recog¬ 
nition  would  moderate  Communist  ardor  at  home  or  abroad.  The  dangers 
to  Bolshevism  are  not  the  emigres  abroad  nor  any  non-Bolshevik  group 
within  Russia.  The  dangers  are  deeply  imbedded  in  Bolshevism  itself. 

Nominally,  the  Government  of  Soviet  Russia  is,  as  you  know,  demo¬ 
cratic.  The  suffrage  is  universal  except  for  the  exclusion  of  the  “non¬ 
producers.”  In  fact,  however,  this  democratic  machinery  is  controlled 
by  the  Communist  Party.  It  is  true  that  non-Communists  predominate 
in  the  village  Soviets ;  that  many  non-Party  members  are  elected  to  the 
provincial  Soviets;  and  even  to  the  All-Russian  Congress  of  Soviets. 
None  the  less,  for  all  practical  purposes,  the  will  of  the  Communist 
minority  finds  little  difficulty  in  expressing  itself  with  complete  effective- 

4 


ness  through  the  Soviet  organs.  Indeed,  the  Soviet  system  is  almost 
an  ideal  instrument  for  utilization  by  a  militant,  cohesive  minority. 

Where  does  final  authority  in  Russia  lie  ?  What  organizations  or  groups 
really  shape  programs  and  finally  determine  specific  policies?  The  an¬ 
swer  is  three-fold.  In  the  routine  administration,  the  Government,  of 
course,  controls.  Frequently,  in  industrial  matters  and  occasionally,  in 
other  questions,  the  voice  of  the  trade  unions  is  decisive.  But,  in  vitally 
important  issues,  it  is  the  Party  which  decides.  How  could  it  be  other¬ 
wise?  Every  high  Russian  official  is  a  Communist.  Every  Communist 
is  subject  to  strict  party  discipline  and  can  be  dismissed  without  right  of 
appeal  by  the  executive  organs  of  the  Party. 

Or  let  us  take  a  concrete  example.  How  far  is  the  Foreign  Office  of 
the  Russian  Government  a  free  agent?  An  answer  was  given  to  me  in 
Moscow  by  one  of  the  most  brilliant  Communists,  which  I  think  is  not 
far  from  correct.  He  said:  “Tchicherin  does  no  harm.  He  knows  the 
diplomatic  forms  and  how  to  call  an  ambassador  ‘Your  Excellency,’  but 
nothing  he  does  really  matters.  The  important  decisions  are  all  made 
elsewhere.”  To  the  extent  to  which  this  is  true  of  the  Foreign  Office, 
it  is  probably  true,  also,  of  other  departments  of  the  Government. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  only  a  few  years  since,  Lenin  and  his  associates 
were  discussing  seriously  whether  it  would  not  be  preferable  to  govern 
Russia  directly  through  the  Party,  rather  than  set  up  a  separate  ma¬ 
chinery  of  government.  It  is  not  Rykoff,  premier  of  the  Council  of  the 
People’s  Commissars ;  nor  Kalinin,  President  of  the  Central  Executive 
Committee;  but  Stalin,  secretary  of  the  Communist  Party  and  head  of 
the  Party’s  highest  organ,  the  Polit  Bureau,  who  is  the  real  leader  and 
spokesman  of  Soviet  Russia. 

In  the  formation  of  the  Union  of  Socialist  Soviet  Republics,  com¬ 
pleted  in  1923,  the  Bolsheviks  made  a  significant  but  little  appreciated 
contribution  to  political  theory  and  practice.  They  combined  to  an  ex¬ 
traordinary  degree  the  elements  of  strength  in  centralism  with  the  essen¬ 
tial  advantages  of  federalism.  Without  weakening  the  control  exercised 
from  Moscow,  they  have  granted  to  the  more  than  thirty-two  republics 
and  autonomous  communes,  or  regions,  a  degree  of  self-government  which 
goes  far  towards  satisfying  the  nationalism  or  localism  of  the  varied 
nationalities  and  groups  which  make  up  such  a  large  proportion  of  the 
Union.  It  is  out  of  the  land  where  the  Czars  used  to  shock  the  world 
with  their  policy  of  ruthless  Russification  that  now  comes  an  example  of 
almost  unprecedented  intelligence  in  the  recognition  of  the  rights  of  mi¬ 
norities. 

I  am  not  forgetful  that  in  some  parts  of  the  Soviet  Union  there  is 
grave  dissatisfaction — as,  for  example,  in  the  Ukraine  or  in  Georgia.  Nor 
do  I  assume  that  all  of  the  constituent  parts  of  the  Union  made  or  keep 
their  connection  with  Moscow  willingly.  But  of  this  I  am  convinced: 
under  the  leadership  of  Stalin,  when  Commissar  of  Nationalities,  the 
Bolsheviks  worked  out  an  imperial  polity  which  illustrates  that  common 

5 


economic  interests  create  ties  stronger  than  invading  armies,  and  that  the 
tolerance  of  national  and  local  languages,  religions  and  other  cultural 
differences  provides  a  sounder  basis  for  unions  than  missionary  imposi¬ 
tion  of  a  supposedly  superior  culture.  Moscow  has  had  the  singular  in¬ 
telligence  to  leave  to  the  constituent  parts  of  the  Union  those  things  which 
concern  them  most,  reserving  to  itself  only  those  powers  deemed  essential 
to  the  maintenance  of  unified  control. 

In  what  direction  is  the  drift  in  Russia?  Is  it  to  the  Right  or  to  the 
Left?  Almost  invariably  returning  travellers  answer  categorically:  “The 
Soviet  Government  is  gradually  but  steadily  returning  to  capitalism,  and 
more  slowly,  but  none  the  less  surely,  to  a  less  radical  and  autocratic 
political  system.”  That  this  view  is  so  widely  held  is  not  surprising. 
The  Soviet  authorities  wish  it  to  be  so,  and  spare  no  effort  in  their 
handling  of  visitors  to  strengthen  this  impression.  Moreover,  visiting 
business  men  talk  mostly  with  men  like  themselves, — technicians,  the 
heads  of  banks,  and  those  responsible  for  the  factories  or  the  railways. 
These  industrialists  and  financiers  talk  the  same  language  as  such  men 
everywhere  in  the  world.  They,  like  the  Government,  are  anxious  that 
the  outside  world  should  believe  that  Communist  Russia  is  on  its  way 
to  the  mourner’s  bench  and  is  about  ready  to  confess  its  sins.  Large 
foreign  credits  are  more  likely  to  be  granted  to  a  repentant  than  to  a 
defiant  Russia ! 

But,  quite  aside  from  these  considerations,  there  are  many  facts  to  sup¬ 
port  these  optimistic  conclusions.  The  Russian  industries  are  organised 
into  trusts  and  syndicates.  In  the  factories  piece  work  is  common;  dif¬ 
ferential  wages  are  the  rule ;  and  managers  are  being  given  more  author¬ 
ity.  Banks  function  as  banks  everywhere.  Strenuous  efforts  are  made 
to  maintain  the  currency  stable.  Internal  loans  with  lottery  features  are 
utilized  to  tease  scanty  savings  out  of  reluctant  pockets.  A  petty  bour¬ 
geoisie  may  be  said  to  be  arising  in  the  country  as  some  of  the  peasants 
begin  to  accumulate  a  surplus,  and  in  the  cities  as  private  traders  gather 
in  their  profits.  Although  the  concessions  to  foreign  capitalists  already 
granted  are  few,  and  most  of  those  unprofitable,  the  system  of  thus  en¬ 
listing  foreign  capital  is  now  being  reorganized  and  systematized.  In  two 
important  instances  during  the  past  summer — the  Harriman  and  the 
Krupp  concessions — the  Russians  made,  without  being  legally  bound  to 
do  so,  important  modifications  in  the  contracts,  with  a  view  to  increasing 
the  chance  for  profitable  exploitation.  In  the  face  of  this  accumulation 
of  evidence  I  am  not  rash  enough  to  declare  that  the  orthodox  view  about 
the  drift  to  the  Right  is  necessarily  incorrect.  I  am  sure,  however,  that 
the  significance  of  the  surrenders  so  far  has  been  exaggerated,  and  I  be¬ 
lieve  that  there  are  substantial  reasons  for  holding  that  in  some  respects 
Russia  is  more  Communistic  than  four  years  ago. 

One  evening,  during  my  stay  in  Moscow,  I  had  an  opportunity  to  listen 
to  a  four-hour  debate  on  the  question:  To  the  Right  or  to  the  Left?  It 
was  at  the  home  of  a  foreign  correspondent,  an  extraordinarily  brilliant 

6 


and  profound  foreign  student  of  Soviet  Russia.  The  only  other  guest, 
besides  my  two  friends,  was  another  foreign  correspondent,  also  an  able 
student  of  Russian  conditions.  He  and  our  host  presented  with  elabo¬ 
rate  carefulness  the  arguments  pro  and  con.  I  returned  to  my  hotel — 
just  as  the  early  Russian  sun  was  beginning  to  lighten  the  great  Square 
of  the  Opera  under  my  window — convinced  that  much  of  the  evidence 
of  growing  conservatism  is  superficial,  not  fundamental;  but  temporary 
modifications  of  preconceived  plans,  not  proof  that  the  original  plans 
have  been  surrendered.  Moreover,  there  is  less  private  industry  and  less 
private  trade  now  in  Russia  than  some  years  earlier.  And  one  of  the 
major  objectives  of  the  governmental  trading  organizations  and  industries 
is  openly  declared  to  be  to  take  over  as  rapidly  as  possible  the  business  at 
present  carried  on  by  private  Russian  capital.  Incidentally,  it  is  signifi¬ 
cant  that  many  of  the  principles  commonly  associated  with  a  liberal  or 
democratic  regime  are  less  observed  today  than  four  or  five  years  ago. 

The  foreign  policy  of  the  Soviet  Government,  I  am  convinced,  is  dom¬ 
inated  by  the  desire  to  maintain  peace.  There  is  no  indication  that  Mos¬ 
cow  desires  a  conflict  with  Poland,  with  the  Border  States,  or  with  Ru¬ 
mania.  Russia’s  predominating  desire  for  peace  is  grounded  on  the 
soundest  of  bases — essential  self-interest.  The  Soviet  authorities  know 
that  nothing  would  so  effectively  wreck  their  program  of  industrialization 
on  which  they  pin  their  dearest  hopes  as  would  an  international  war.  It 
is  because  they  anticipate  such  dire  evils  from  a  conflict  of  arms  that 
they  are  convinced  that  Britain  is  determined  to  precipitate  just  such  a 
conflict.  Britain  is  the  enemy;  the  Arcos  raid,  the  raid  on  the  Soviet 
Legation  in  Peking,  the  breaking-off  of  diplomatic  relations  are  in  Mos¬ 
cow  interpreted  as  parts  of  a  unified  British  program  to  isolate  and  en¬ 
circle  Russia,  and  but  preparatory  to  a  military  attack  against  her  by 
one  of  her  neighbors.  Thus  would  the  Soviet  power  be  weakened  by 
the  prolonged  bleeding  of  one  of  its  constituent  parts. 

Convinced  that  the  British  danger  is  real,  the  Soviet  Government  spares 
no  effort  to  prove  to  the  world  its  peaceful  intentions,  but  these  endeavors 
are  being  constantly  negatived  by  the  activities  of  the  Russian  Com¬ 
munist  Party  and  the  Third  International,  neither  of  which  the  Govern¬ 
ment  has  power  to  control.  Frequently  one  hears  the  argument  that  it 
does  not  wish  to  control  them,  but  I  think  a  fairer  explanation  is  that  it 
knows  it  could  not  and  therefore  does  not  dare  to  try.  The  basic  anomaly 
in  Russia’s  foreign  relations  lies  directly  here.  The  Third  International 
has  not  given  up  its  program  of  world  revolution.  The  Russian  Com¬ 
munist  Party  has  not  and  will  not  disavow  its  support  of  that  program. 
Hence,  the  constant  embarrassment  in  which  the  Government  finds  itself 
when  its  efforts  for  the  establishment  and  maintenance  of  normal  rela¬ 
tions  abroad  are  thwarted  by  the  Communist  organizations. 

The  Communist  Party  is  much  misunderstood  abroad.  It  is  an  ex¬ 
clusive  and  tightly  organized  body  of  religious  zealots.  The  difference 
between  it  and  liberal  parties  outside  of  Russia  is  not  one  of  degree, 

7 


but  one  of  kind.  It  is  difficult  to  get  into  the  Party  and  very  easy  to 
get  out.  Only  those  whose  ancestry  is  correct,  or  who  have  shown  over 
a  long  period  of  probation  that  they  are  prepared  loyally  to  live  up  to 
the  rigid  discipline  of  the  Party,  are  admitted.  Any  member  may  be  sum¬ 
marily  expelled.  The  total  membership  is  now  approximately  a  million. 
If  to  those  we  add  the  two  million  Komsomols,  the  youth  from  14  to  22, 
and  about  the  same  number  of  Pioneers,  aged  8  to  14,  the  total  number 
of  Communists  and  those  in  training  for  membership  would  reach  about 
five  million. 

The  motivation  of  Communism  is  not  essentially  economic  nor  cul¬ 
tural,  it  is  religious.  Though  they  have  abolished  religion  in  the  old- 
fashioned  sense,  the  Communists  have  set  up  a  new  creed.  Marx's  writ¬ 
ings  are  the  Old  Testament;  Lenin's  writings  are  the  New  Testament. 
Lenin  now,  more  than  three  years  after  his  death,  lies  in  state,  to  be 
viewed  by  thousands  of  people  every  day.  They  are  not  permitted  to 
kiss  his  hands,  as  used  to  be  done  with  the  bodies  of  saints,  but  this  is 
a  hygienic  difference  rather  than  one  of  principle. 

Talking  one  day  with  a  young  Communist  girl  whose  father  and  mother 
had  both  been  exiles  and  were  now  active  in  the  Communist  Party,  I 
asked  her,  “What  would  be  your  attitude  toward  your  father  and  mother 
if  they  were  bourgeois  and  you  were  a  Communist?" 

Her  reply,  immediate  and  without  any  sign  of  bravado,  was,  “I  would 
leave  them.  What  else  could  I  do  ?  I  couldn't  live  with  them,  could  I  ?" 

Here  one  had  in  this  frank  reply  a  poignant  illustration  of  the  superior 
devotion  which  Communism  demands.  This  loyalty  is  not  very  different 
from  that  demanded  of  its  adherents  by  primitive  Christianity. 

One  of  the  ablest  leaders  of  American  Protestantism,  who  had  had 
many  occasions  to  discuss  the  Communist  psychology,  said  to  me,  “I  am 
sure  that  Communism  contains  within  itself  those  same  three  essential, 
elements  which  have  been  the  basis  of  every  great  religion: 

“1.  The  intense  desire  to  establish  the  Kingdom  of  God  on  earth. 
(Of  course,  without  the  traditional  God.) 

“2.  Profound  belief  in  the  worth  of  the  individual  and  the  possibility 
of  his  conversion  and  redemption. 

“3.  The  faith  that  each  individual  has  his  role  to  play  in  the  remak¬ 
ing  of  the  world." 

I  believe  that  this  observer  is  right. 

Certainly  those  who  assume  that  individualism  has  been  crushed  by  the 
revolution  are  mistaken.  The  most  profound  student  of  Communism 
whom  I  know  said  to  me  in  Moscow,  “I  believe  one  aspect  of  the  revolu¬ 
tion  which  has  been  almost  completely  ignored  abroad  is  likely  to  prove 
in  the  long  run  about  the  most  important.  For  millions  of  people  who 
are  not  Communist  the  revolution  has  broken  the  shackles  of  century-old 
traditions  and  caste.  Millions  of  peasants  are  for  the  first  time  beginning 

8 


to  think  for  themselves.  In  the  course  of  generations,  I  believe  that  this 
freeing  of  the  masses  from  the  trammels  of  the  past  may  effect  pro¬ 
founder  changes  in  Russia  and  in  the  world  than  all  of  the  Communist 
theorizing.,, 

Is  there  not  a  real  danger  of  a  split  within  the  Party?  If  one  reads 
the  headlines  of  the  news  dispatches  from  Moscow,  and,  more  especially, 
those  from  Riga  and  other  border  cities,  the  conclusion  would  seem  in¬ 
escapable  that  the  struggle  between  the  Opposition  and  the  Government 
must  end  in  open  strife.  But  I  am  convinced  that  this  is  not  likely  to 
result.  I  believe  that  the  Party  is  stronger  than  any  leader  or  group  of 
leaders.  I  believe  its  cohesive  force  to  be  so  great  that  any  man  or  group 
of  men  who  seriously  threatened  the  unity  of  the  organization  would  be 
destroyed. 

What  are  the  differences  between  Trotzky,  Zinovieff,  Kamenieff,  Ra- 
dek,  and  the  other  Oppositionists,  and  Stalin  and  the  dominant  groups 
in  the  Party  and  the  Government?  There  are  at  least  five: 

1.  The  Opposition  would  democratize  the  Party  control,  they  would 
minimize  the  role  of  the  “apparatus,”  that  is  the  party  machine,  they 
would  encourage  the  infusion  of  younger  blood  into  the  higher  Party 
and  Governmental  positions.  They  accuse  Stalin  and  his  associates  of 
bureaucratic  tyranny.  He  retorts  by  charging  them  with  fractionalism 
verging  on  counter-revolution. 

2.  The  Opposition  charges  the  powers  that  be  with  neglecting  their 
opportunities  abroad  to  aid  revolutionary  movements.  They  insist  that 
the  bureaucracy  is  so  absorbed  in  maintaining  its  own  power  and  in 
achieving  its  program  at  home  that  it  is  forgetting  the  world  mission. 
They  argue  that  the  Bolshevik  experiment -in  Russia  can  only  succeed  if 
Bolshevism  is  successful  elsewhere.  Stalin  replies :  We  are  not  for¬ 
getful  of  our  duties  and  opportunities  abroad,  but  our  major  task  is  to 
make  the  Bolshevik  experiment  in  Russia  succeed.  Its  success  at  home 
will  be  the  best  propaganda  abroad.  Let  us  concentrate  on  the  first  things 

first. 

3.  The  Oppositionists  criticize  the  Government  for  slowing-up,  un¬ 
justifiably,  the  tempo  of  industrialization.  They  mean  that  the  Govern¬ 
ment,  by  relinquishing  the  pressure  on  the  peasants,  is  permitting,  even 
encouraging  the  growth  of  a  petty  bourgeoisie  in  the  country  and  is  fail¬ 
ing  to  secure,  through  higher  taxes,  the  surplus  necessary  to  hothouse 
the  development  of  new  industries.  As  one  of  the  Opposition  said  to  us: 
We  must  continue  to  be  heroic  and  we  must  make  the  peasant  and  every 
one  else  draw  his  belt  tighter.  Higher  taxes  and  lower  prices  are  vastly 
preferable  to  lower  taxes  and  higher  prices.  The  Government  replies: 
We,  too,  want  to  hasten  industrialization,  but  your  program  of  pressing 
the  peasant  still  harder  would  be  self-defeating.  He  must  be  permitted 
to  become  prosperous,  otherwise  he  will  not  produce  that  surplus  which 
is  absolutely  essential  if  we  are  to  have  the  materials  for  export,  with- 

9 


out  which  we  cannot  make  abroad  those  purchases  imperatively  needed 
for  the  very  industrial  development  you  are  so  keen  about. 

4.  The  Oppositionists  have  also  criticized  the  Government  and  the 
Third  International  for  neglecting  their  opportunities  in  the  West,  by  pay¬ 
ing  too  much  attention  to  China,  and  especially  for  having  played  with 
the  Kuomintang,  who  “were  certain”  to  discard  their  Bolshevik  asso¬ 
ciates  just  as  soon  as  it  suited  their  book.  To  these  charges  Stalin  has 
made  no  effective  reply. 

5.  Perhaps  the  most  basic  difference  between  the  two  groups  is  that 
the  Oppositionists  are  the  “hundred  per  centers.”  They  are  the  thor¬ 
oughly  orthodox;  they  seize  upon  every  concession  to  opportunism  as  a 
betrayal  of  Communism.  Stalin  and  those  who  work  with  him,  faced 
with  the  responsibilities  of  power,  find  that  orthodoxy  is  more  satisfactory 
on  the  platform  than  in  a  governmental  bureau. 

What  will  happen  to  Trotzky  and  the  leaders  of  the  Opposition?  He, 
and  most  of  the  others,  have  already  been  expelled  successively  from  the 
Polit  Bureau,  the  highest  organ  of  the  Communist  Power,  from  the  Exec¬ 
utive  Committee  of  the  Third  International,  from  the  Executive  Com¬ 
mittee  of  the  Communist  Party,  and  finally,  a  few  days  ago,  from  the 
Party  itself.  What  now?  As  non-Party  members,  any  political  activity 
is  tantamount  to  counter-revolution. 

One  goes  to  Russia  expecting  to  find  everybody  in  power  talking  poli¬ 
tics.  It  was  a  matter  of  great  surprise,  therefore,  that  almost  no  one 
talks  politics — at  least  to  foreigners.  Nearly  every  one  whom  I  saw  was 
concerned  with  one  problem,  and  one  problem  only,  the  industrialization 
of  Russia.  The  aim  is  grandiose — industrialization  on  the  scale  carried 
out  in  America.  The  methods  favored  are  American  methods.  Indeed, 
American  technique,  American  efficiency,  American  scientific  manage¬ 
ment — all  these  are  favorite  enthusiasms  of  Communist  and  other  Russian 
functionaries.  Henry  Ford  is  to  them  the  great  American.  As  Lenin 
said,  “Electricity  is  culture.” 

The  scope  of  their  industrial  program  is  magnificent,  or,  if  one  were 
a  cynic,  one  might  say  Utopian.  They  plan  not  merely  to  industrialize 
the  city,  but  to  industrialize  the  countryside.  They  expect  not  merely 
to  communize  the  industry  in  the  centers,  but  to  communize  the  vast 
agricultural  stretches  of  Russia.  They  expect  to  lift  the  peasant  from 
the  soil;  win  him  away  from  love  of  his  own  individual  tract  of  land; 
teach  him  the  superior  advantages  of  cultivation  on  a  large  scale;  prole- 
tarianize  him;  and,  through  a  vastly  higher  standard  of  living  than  he 
has  ever  known,  woo  him  to  Communism. 

More  challenging  than  the  scope  of  their  program  is  their  plan  for 
integrating  the  whole  of  the  economic  life  of  140  millions/  of  people. 
Already  they  exercise  a  complete  monopoly  of  foreign  trade  and  an  in¬ 
creasing  control  of  domestic  industry  and  trade.  Through  the  famous 
Gosplan,  the  government  lays  down  from  year  to  year  and  for  five-year 

10 


periods  exactly  what  production  is  to  be  expected  in  the  fields  of  in¬ 
dustry,  agriculture,  mining  and  so  on.  I  was  told  that  each  year  the 
gap  between  expectation  and  result  grows  smaller. 

But  they  are  not  satisfied  to  plan.  They  have  set  up  a  Superior  Eco¬ 
nomic  Council  over  the  whole  of  industry,  except  the  railways,  with 
something  like  the  supreme  power  of  a  General  Staff  in  time  of  war.  It 
determines  what  funds  will  be  allocated  to  each  of  the  industries;  de¬ 
cides  whether,  for  example,  the  railways  shall  contribute  to  other  in¬ 
dustries  through  reduction  of  freight  rates,  or  whether  the  oil  industry 
will  subsidize  the  manufacturing  industry  by  an  abnormally  low  price  for 
oil.  As  I  talked  to  the  high  officials  of  this  Council,  I  could  not  but  feel 
that  the  elder  Morgan  or  the  elder  Harriman  would  have  been  intrigued 
at  the  possibility  of  exercising  such  unique  power  over  the  economic  and 
industrial  life  of  one-eighth  of  the  earth’s  surface. 

Whether  one  thinks  the  Communist  industrialization  program  is  Utopian 
or  not,  it  is  an  undisputable  proof  of  the  daring  of  a  handful  of  men  who, 
not  satisfied  with  maintaining  power,  believe  that  they  can  and  will  re¬ 
make  the  social,  the  economic,  and  the  cultural  life  of  a  country  which 
sprawls  out  over  the  whole  of  eastern  Europe  and  northern  Asia,  with 
its  nearly  150  millions  of  people — mostly  medieval  and  of  diverse  lan¬ 
guages,  religions  and  cultures.  Much,  then,  as  one  may  criticize  Bolshe¬ 
vik  methods,  the  grandeur  of  their  conceptions  and  their  courage  in  under¬ 
taking  the  apparently  impossible  must  give  even  their  most  violent  op¬ 
ponents  occasion  for  thought. 

Many  phases  of  present  day  life  in  Russia  which  seem  strange  are 
after  all  only  old  virtues  or  old  vices  with  new  names.  I  am  told  that  this 
very  habit  of  seeing  things  in  the  large,  or  planning  grand  experiments, 
is  Russian  rather  than  Communist.  Similarly,  one  of  the  most  criticised 
failures  of  Communism,  the  notorious  scissors,  is,  I  am  told,  not  Com¬ 
munist,  but  Russian.  In  other  words,  prior  to  the  war  the  peasant  was 
paid  very  meagerly  for  what  he  produced  and  had  to  pay  high  prices  for 
what  he  bought.  The  difference  was  almost  as  striking  as  now.  He 
was  always  exploited.  Cynics  would  add,  he  probably  always  will  be. 
Similarly,  those  who  say  that  the  Communists  can  not  continue  in 
power  because  the  standard  of  life  they  have  provided  is  so  low,  forget 
that  the  standard  of  life  in  Russia  has  always  been  low — unbelievably 
low  in  the  villages,  compared  with  anything  to  which  we  are  accustomed. 

The  terror,  too,  is  in  some  respects  Russian  rather  than  Communist. 
At  any  rate,  as  I  have  spoken  to  people  about  my  impressions  of  the 
terror  since  leaving  Russia,  I  have  been  surprised  at  the  number  of  times 
that  men  who  knew  the  old  Russia  said  to  me:  “What  you  describe  is 
not  unlike  the  activities  of  the  secret  police  under  the  Czar,  only  apparently 
the  Workers’  and  Peasants’  Inspection  and  the  OGPU  are  more  effective.” 
Certainly  the  terror  is  not  academic,  it  is  very  real.  Yet  its  depressing  ef¬ 
fect  on  the  life  of  Russia  can  easily  be  exaggerated.  It  influences  little,  or 

11 


not  at  all,  the  great  mass  of  people,  the  peasants.  It  is  not  noticeably  de¬ 
pressing  in  its  influence  on  the  workers.  The  only  classes  upon  which 
it  bears  down  with  its  full  appalling  weight  are  those  of  the  old  regime, 
most  of  whom  are  like  you  in  this  room.  To  these  millions,  the  terror 
is  still  an  awful  thing.  Constant  censorship  of  the  mail  and  the  telephone; 
constant  scrutiny  of  visitors;  constant  danger  of  arbitrary  arrest  and 
exile ;  these  spectres  are  with  the  intellectuals  and  the  other  classes  of  the 
old  regime  day  and  night.  They  constitute  the  heaviest  indictment  against 
the  Bolshevik  regime. 

There  are  many  unsettling  phenomena  in  Russia,  but  the  terror  is  to 
my  mind  not  the  worst  of  these.  I  believe  that  more  distressing  to 
millions  of  Russians  than  any  repressive  activity  of  the  Government  is  a 
condition  which  Communists  welcome  and  for  which  they  are  in  part 
responsible.  I  refer  to  the  yawning  chasm  between  old  and  young.  I 
know,  of  course,  that  the  old  never  understand  the  young,  and  the  young 
are  always  intolerant  of  the  old.  I  am  told  that  this  is  everywhere  true 
today.  But  I  am  sure  that  in  Russia  this  cleavage  has  been  accented  to 
a  degree  unequalled  elsewhere.  Indeed,  the  Government  and  the  Party 
have  more  or  less  deliberately  sought  to  set  the  young  against  the  old — 
the  old  are  hopeless,  they  cannot  be  taught;  only  the  young  are  willing 
to  break  with  the  past !  Hence  the  emphasis  in  the  schools,  in  the  popu¬ 
lar  demonstrations  and  in  the  countrywide  propaganda  upon  theories  and 
ideas  which,  challenging  the  young,  make  them  feel  that  their  parents 
are  linked  to  an  obscurantist  and  superstitious  past.  Old  ideas  of  the 
home,  old  ideas  of  marriage,  old  ideas  of  religion  are  attacked  with  logic 
and  satire  and  burlesque.  In  millions  of  families  where  there  is  no  real 
Communism,  I  am  sure  that  the  hearts  of  fathers  and  mothers  are 
anguished  by  the  loss,  in  the  most  tragic  sense,  of  their  sons  and  daughters. 

Can  the  radicalism  of  Bolshevism  be  moderated  by  political  recognition 
of  Soviet  Russia,  and  through  the  granting  of  substantial  credits  to 
Russian  industry?  The  answer  of  many  American  students  of  the  Rus¬ 
sian  problem  is,  “Yes!”  I  am  not  so  sure.  I  would  not  deny  this  possi¬ 
bility;  however,  I  feel  quite  strongly  that  the  case  for  it  has  not  been 
proved.  It  is  arguable  that  Bolshevism,  motivated  by  a  religious  zeal¬ 
otry,  can  continue  to  be  dominant  only  so  long  as  this  motivation  is  essen¬ 
tially  undiluted,  and  that  therefore  those  in  power  will  be  forced  from 
time  to  time  to  carry  out  counter-revolutions  against  each  growing  tend¬ 
ency  towards  moderation.  I  do  not  suggest  this  theory  as  my  own,  but 
as  one  that  deserves  consideration.  Nor  do  I  argue  that, — assuming 
this  theory  I  have  suggested  to  be  tenable, — therefore,  non-recognition  is 
a  desirable  policy.  I  am  merely  urging  that  the  decision  as  to  recognition 
and  non-recognition  be  not  based  on  the  expectation  that  action  from  the 
outside  will  decisively  affect  the  moving  forces  within  Russia. 

Communism,  or  at  any  rate  Communist  control,  has,  as  far  as  one  can 
see  today  in  Russia,  come  to  stay,  perhaps  for  many  decades.  It  cannot 
be  endangered  by  the  emigres  from  Paris  or  New  York  or  London.  It 

12 


cannot  be  endangered  by  the  old  regime  groups  in  Russia.  The  peasants, 
so  long  as  they  have  their  land  and  are  reasonably  satisfied  with  the  re¬ 
turn  for  their  crops,  have  no  incentive  to  support  any  change,  particularly 
since  they  fear  it  would  bring  back  the  landlord.  The  workers,  though 
not  so  well  off  economically,  perhaps,  as  we  are  frequently  told,  have 
gained  many  imponderable  advantages  and  are  the  basis  of  the  present 
regime. 

My  theory,  which  is  only  a  theory  and  perhaps  of  little  value,  is  this : 
If  Communism  is  destroyed,  it  will  be  destroyed  by  forces  not  outside 
but  within  itself — by  the  weaknesses  of  bureaucracy  and  of  autocracy, 
by  the  temptations  which  come  from  success,  by  such  practices  as  differ¬ 
ential  wages,  by  the  gradual  diminution  of  religious  zeal.  But  the  day 
of  such  weakness  is  not  yet.  The  Communists  are  still  masters  in  their 
own  houses. 

We  from  the  outside  can,  I  believe,  do  little  to  help  them  or  to  change 
them.  But  we  can,  if  we  will,  show  that  capitalism  is  capable  of  such 
modifications — so  brilliantly  and  courageously  forecast  by  Owen  D. 
Young  in  his  recent  address  at  Harvard — as  to  make  revolution  an  ab¬ 
surdity,  and  that  democracy  can  be  made  to  work  so  as  to  remove  any 
excuse  for  or  danger  of  dictatorship,  either  from  the  Right  or  the  Left. 

The  Chairman  :  We  have  learned  in  the  last  few  years  to  expect  the 
downright  and  the  candid  from  Mr.  McDonald,  and  we  have  not  been 
disappointed  this  afternoon. 

We  can  also  expect  a  somewhat  similar  technique  from  the  next  speak¬ 
er,  Mr.  Stuart  Chase.  I  suppose  you  have  all  read  Your  Money's  Worth. 
Mr.  Chase,  like  Mr.  McDonald,  flaunts  a  Harvard  degree,  and  he  was  so 
far  buried  in  allegiance  to  fact  that  for  quite  a  time  he  functioned  as 
a  certified  public  accountant.  Mr.  Chase  was  a  member  of  the  Federal 
Trade  Commission  and  wrote  the  report  on  the  Chicago  Packers,  but 
facts  and  politics  do  not  blend,  and  when  Mr.  Harding  came  into  the 
White  House,  Mr.  Chase  was  fired. 

He  has  been  over  in  Russia,  too,  this  last  summer.  If  he  will  pardon 
a  bit  of  gossip  I  picked  up  on  the  street,  I  am  told  that  among  his  adven¬ 
tures  in  Russia  was  an  interview  with  the  great  Stalin  himself.  Mr. 
Chase  fired  at  Mr.  Stalin  a  long  list  of  impertinent  questions  derived  from 
his  journalistic  experience  in  America,  and  Mr.  Stalin  replied  with  great 
politeness  and  with  still  greater  length,  but,  according  to  gossip,  entirely 
avoided  answering  any  of  the  questions  that  Mr.  Chase  had  asked  of  him. 
It  is  further  reported  that,  before  the  end  of  the  interview,  Mr.  Chase 
was  fast  asleep. 

That  is  another  example  of  the  difference  between  Russians  and  Amer¬ 
icans.  Did  you  ever  hear  of  a  journalist  falling  asleep  interviewing  Mr. 
Coolidge  ? 

To  shorten  the  afternoon,  I  will  break  in  by  introducing  Mr.  Stuart 
Chase. 


13 


MR.  STUART  CHASE 


MR.  CHAIRMAN,  Ladies  and  Gentlemen:  That  is  not  quite  true 
about  Stalin.  I  did  not  have  a  chance  to  give  him  the  questions  I 
had  in  mind.  I  think  only  one  of  the  questions  that  were  addressed  to 
him  was  mine.  Most  of  the  questions  dealt  with  political  matters  on 
which  I  am  an  ignoramous,  and  in  the  very  long  rendition  from  Russian 
into  English  and  vice  versa  I  might  have  dozed.  I  trust  I  was  not  so 
impolite  as  to  go  really  to  sleep. 

I  spent  about  a  month  last  summer  in  Russia  studying  production  and 
industrial  coordination.  I  went  to  Moscow,  Leningrad,  Kharkhov,  Kiev, 
Odessa,  and  other  cities  and  towns  in  the  Ukraine,  the  bread  basket  of 
Russia.  I  travelled  about  a  thousand  miles  by  motor  car  through  the 
outlying  agricultural  districts  in  the  Ukraine.  I  swam  in  the  Baltic,  in 
the  Black  Sea,  and  in  points  between,  and  I  noted  to  my  dismay  that  Will 
Rogers  is  not  to  be  depended  upon  as  a  statistician.  There  are  lots  of 
bathing  suits  in  Russia.  The  idea  seems  to  be  that  if  you  have  a  bathing 
suit,  you  wear  it,  and  so  cast  envy  into  the  heart  of  the  undraped  Mrs. 
Jonesky. 

No  train  that  I  was  on  in  Russia  was  ever  late,  and  I  doubt  if  the 
engineer  had  me  in  mind  as  he  operated  the  throttle.  I  saw  no  evidence 
of  violence,  of  disorder,  or  cruelty,  and  I  walked  the  streets  of  Moscow 
and  of  other  cities  alone  and  at  night  for  miles  and  miles.  But  coming 
from  my  hotel  at  Kiev  one  morning,  I  saw  a  perfectly  gorgeous  riot  in 
progress.  There  were  milling  crowds,  soldiers,  uniforms,  yells,  pursuits, 
pistol  shots !  I  was  thrilled.  Here  was  the  Russia  of  the  Riga  press  dis¬ 
patches.  Then,  alas,  I  saw  the  director  waving  his  megaphone,  and  the 
camera  men  on  the  hotel  balcony.  The  Ukraine  Government  moving  pic¬ 
ture  studios  were  shooting  a  film ! 

My  dominant  impression  of  Russia  was  of  a  strong,  orderly,  loyal, 
going  concern.  I  would  not  recommend  its  invasion  by  a  foreign  military 
power.  They  can  invade  if  they  want  to,  but  I  would  not  recommend  it. 
But  it  is  far  from  a  land  flowing  with  milk  and  honey.  It  has  a  much 
lower  standard  of  living  than  the  United  States  or  than  any  western 
country.  But  its  people  look  healthy  and  well  fed.  I  was  particularly 
struck  by  the  contrast  between  the  workers  in  Moscow,  or  in  Leningrad, 
and  a  large  group  of  workers  whom  I  saw  attending  a  Sacco-Vanzetti 
demonstration  in  Paris  on  the  way  in,  with  the  contrast  all  in  favor  of 
Russia,  biologically  speaking.  The  children  look  healthy, .  save  for  a 
hundred  or  so  of  the  famous  ragamuffins  whom  I  saw  during  the  time 
that  I  was  there. 

No  one  pays  very  much  attention  to  clothing.  You  wear  what  you 
want.  It  is  adequate  though  often  shabby.  I  saw  just  three  pairs  of  silk 
stockings  and  one  dinner  coat.  Shelter  is  bad  in  Moscow.  It  is  terribly 
overcrowded,  particularly  due  to  the  shifting  of  the  Government  from 
Leningrad,  but  there  is  considerable  evidence  of  new  building  activity.  Of 
comforts  there  are  few,  save  for  an  apparently  inexhaustible  supply  of 

14 


tea  and  cigarettes,  and  save  for  the  magnificent  performances  to  be  seen 
at  the  theater — the  ballet,  the  opera,  and  the  symphony  concerts.  I  think 
the  most  exciting  evening  that  I  ever  spent  in  the  theater  was  in  the  great 
white  and  gold  opera  house  in  Moscow  watching  one  of  the  new  ballets. 

The  facilities  for  recreation  which  have  been  created  by  the  new  Gov¬ 
ernment  are  very  considerable.  They  include  swimming  clubs,  shooting 
galleries,  summer  parks,  soccer  fields,  vacation  homes,  and  clubs  of  the 
trade  unions.  The  favorite  target  in  the  shooting  galleries  (we  came  in 
right  after  the  break  with  England)  was  a  picture  of  Chamberlain  with 
his  monocle  as  the  bull’s  eye. 

The  Club  of  the  Seamen’s  Union  at  Odessa  particularly  impressed  me. 
It  was  the  palace  of  the  sometime  Governor  of  Odessa — an  enormous, 
luxurious  place — and,  as  a  member  of  the  Harvard  Club  of  New  York, 
I  know  when  I  have  been  outclassed.  But  such  exhibits,  of  course,  are 
few  and  far  between. 

The  primary  thing  for  the  visitor  to  realize  is  that  Russia  is  the  East. 
Since  time  immemorial  the  East  has  contrasted  squalor  with  glittering 
luxury.  Over  it  hangs  an  odor  alien  to  Western  nostrils. 

The  luxury  in  Russia  has  largely  disappeared  now,  save  for  a  series 
of  horrible  examples  which  have  been  kept  clean  and  shining.  The  Czar’s 
summer  palace  at  Tsarskoye  Selo  is  as  immaculate  as  ever  and  is  delib¬ 
erately  designed  to  show  just  how  the  nobility  and  the  court  used  to  live. 
Meanwhile  the  squalor  still  remains  over  large  areas. 

One  must  realize,  also,  that  it  is  primarily  and  overwhelmingly  an  agri¬ 
cultural  land,  a  land  of  peasants.  Eighty-five  per  cent  of  the  total  popu¬ 
lation  of  Russia  are  peasants,  with  here  and  there  a  city  lost  in  an  unend¬ 
ing  reach  of  steppe,  with  here  and  there  a  factory — rare  as  cathedrals 
in  other  lands.  You  cannot  compare  Russia  with  America.  It  is  at  once 
absurd  and  unjust  as  a  yardstick  for  measuring  its  progress.  It  can  only 
be  compared  with  itself  in  former  years,  or  with  other  countries  of  the 
East.  The  only  other  country  with  which  I  am  familiar  at  all  is  Egypt, 
and  I  confess  frankly  that  I  prefer  Russia. 

How  does  the  Russia  of  today  contrast  with  the  Russia  of  1913,  before 
the  war?  I  was  not  there  in  1913.  I  do  not  know  how  Russia  looked  or 
smelled  in  those  days,  but  I  can  give  you  some  figures — reasonably  reli¬ 
able  figures.  I  speak  now  as  a  certified  public  accountant,  not  unmindful 
of  the  higher  reaches  of  dubious  statistics.  If  we  take  the  index  of  in¬ 
dustrial  production  in  1913  as  100,  industrial  production  by  weight  in 
this  year,  1927,  would  be  about  109,  a  9  per  cent  increase.  Agricultural 
production  this  year  will  be  about  101.  So  modern  Russia  has  just 
passed  the  1913  level. 

The  quality  of  that  production  is  poor.  It  has  been  improving  in  the 
last  year  or  two,  but  on  the  whole  it  is  poor.  That  is  offset  to  a  certain 
degree,  however,  by  the  fact  that,  of  the  entire  output  of  industrial  pro¬ 
duction,  the  overwhelming  bulk  is  in  the  form  of  necessities  and  simple 

15 


comforts  that  are  applicable  to  the  rank  and  file  of  the  population.  There 
are  no  factories  undertaking  to  carry  out  annual  changes  in  drawing¬ 
room  furniture;  there  are  no  confections  guaranteed  to  improve  our  pop¬ 
ularity  at  dances.  The  stuff  they  are  producing  is  of  immediate  value 
to  the  common  man. 

How  about  the  material  condition  of  the  industrial  workers  and  of  the 
other  classes  in  Russia?  Paul  Douglas,  of  the  University  of  Chicago, 
who  was  with  us,  finds  that  the  industrial  worker  is  about  thirty-five  per 
cent  better  off  today  than  he  was  in  1913,  including  his  real  wages,  plus 
the  quite  magnificent  social  insurance  schemes  that  have  been  applied  to 
industrial  workers.  I  would  hesitate  to  be  as  specific  as  thirty-five  per 
cent,  but  my  conviction  is  that  the  industrial  workers  are  materially  better 
off  today.  But  there  are  only  about  three  million  factory  workers  and 
they  suffer,  as  workers  in  other  lands  suffer,  from  a  serious  problem  of 
unemployment. 

The  peasants  today  are  in  about  the  same  material  condition  that  they 
were  in  1913.  They  have  rather  more  of  their  own  food  to  eat — eggs, 
poultry  and  butter — and  they  have  rather  less  by  way  of  manufactured 
articles.  They  have,  however,  the  satisfaction,  and  a  very  material  one 
it  is,  of  possessing  the  land. 

The  middle  classes,  the  clerks,  the  intellectuals,  our  sort  of  people,  are 
undeniably  worse  off  than  they  were  in  1913.  Whether  that  is  good 
for  their  souls  or  not,  I  am  unable  to  specify. 

Industry  has  made  enormous  strides  since  the  New  Economic  Policy 
was  inaugurated  in  1921.  In  that  year,  production  had  shrunk  to  17  per 
cent  of  the  pre-war  level,  and  now  after  six  years  it  is  above  the  1913 
level.  This  is  an  astonishing  recovery. 

I  wish  that  I  had  time  to  tell  you  of  the  organization  of  the  govern¬ 
ment  trusts  that  operate  Russian  industry,  but  all  that  I  can  do  is  answer 
a  question  that  has  been  repeatedly  put  to  me :  How  much  so¬ 
cialism,  how  much  communism,  are  there  in  Russia  today? 

As  far  as  I  know  anything  about  pure  communism,  I  would  say  there 
is  not  a  trace  of  it  in  Russia  today,  but  of  socialism  there  is  consider¬ 
able.  Plowever,  the  largest  group  in  Russia,  as  we  know,  is  the  peasant. 
Ninety  per  cent  of  the  total  output  of  agriculture  is  carried  on  by  private 
individuals,  the  private  traders.  The  peasant  cannot  be  called  a  capitalist 
because  he  is  not  working  in  a  factory;  he  does  not  employ  factory 
methods  which  are  implicit  in  a  definition  of  capitalism.  He  is  a  private 
trader,  and,  therefore,  is  not  carrying  on  his  work  from  the  point  of  view 
of  a  socialized  economy. 

Eighty  per  cent  of  the  industrial  production,  however,  is  in  the  hands 
of  government  trusts,  and  you  can  call  the  system  state  socialism  or  state 
capitalism,  as  you  prefer.  Sometimes  I  wake  up  in  the  night  and  wonder 
if  these  great  industrial  trusts  of  Russia  and  our  combinations  and  trusts 
here  in  America  are  not  paralleling  the  same  road,  and  whether  in  another 
generation  there  will  be  a  great  deal  to  choose  between  them. 

16 


The  bulk  of  all  wholesale  trade  is  in  the  hands  of  the  Government  and 
is  socialized,  while  about  seventy  per  cent  of  all  retail  trade  is  carried  on 
either  through  Government  stores  or  through  the  cooperative  stores,  which 
latter  the  Government  is  aiding  by  all  means  in  its  power. 

Finally,  there  is  state  control  of  money,  of  prices  and  of  credit.  Thus, 
so  far  as  distribution,  and  the  bulk  of  industrial  production  is  concerned, 
we  have  a  socialized  state,  but  the  greatest  job  of  all  in  Russia,  agricul¬ 
ture,  is  overwhelmingly  in  the  hands  of  the  peasant  as  a  private  trader, 
selling  his  output  at  fixed  prices  to  the  Government. 

To  me  the  most  significant  thing  in  Russia  was  the  Gosplan.  I  think 
it  is  the  most  interesting  economic  experiment  in  history.  It  is  our  own 
War  Industries  Board  of  1918  carried  three  or  four  steps  into  the  fu¬ 
ture.  It  is  an  attempt  to  integrate  a  sixth  of  the  world’s  land  area  and 
the  activity  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  million  people  into  one  coordinated 
economic  plan.  Sixteen  men,  constituting  the  praesidium  of  the  State 
Planning  Commission,  locally  known  as  the  “Gosplan,”  are  blocking  out 
the  future  of  agriculture,  of  industry,  of  transportation,  of  super-power, 
of  exports,  of  imports,  for  fifteen  years  in  advance.  A  very  careful  and 
detailed  plan  is  made  for  the  coming  year,  a  careful  but  less  detailed  plan 
for  the  next  five  years,  while  general  industrial  policies  are  laid  down  for 
fifteen  years  ahead. 

Into  the  great  barracks  which  house  the  Moscow  Gosplan,  with  its  five 
hundred  economists,  statisticians,  and  engineers,  come  feeding  the  figures 
from  every  rural  area,  from  every  industrial  focal  point.  These  figures 
are  built  up  into  control  totals,  and  on  the  basis  of  these  totals  the  appor¬ 
tionment  of  new  capital  is  laid  down  for  the  years  to  come.  Yardsticks 
are  set  up  for  measuring  the  quota  which  each  agricultural  area,  each 
industry,  is  required  to  produce  in  the  immediate  future.  On  the  walls 
of  the  factories  that  we  visited  were  these  quota  lines  in  red,  together 
with  the  line  of  the  actual  performance.  Wherever  I  went  I  saw  and  felt 
the  hand  of  this  centralized  planning. 

The  Gosplan  calls,  in  its  five-year  program,  for  a  seventy-eight  per  cent 
increase  in  industrial  production,  by  weight,  in  1932,  and  a  thirty  per  cent 
increase  in  agricultural  production — thus  closing  the  famous  scissors. 
From  what  I  was  able  to  see  and  learn,  I  believe  that,  if  there  are  no 
serious  outside  disturbances  and  no  internal  break-up  in  the  party,  the 
quota  will  be  met.  But  even  after  it  is  met,  Russia  will  still  be  far  from 
an  industrialized  country  as  we  know  it  in  America — so  great  is  the  dis¬ 
tance  that  the  East  has  yet  to  go. 

The  basic  policies  of  the  Gosplan  are  economic  self-sufficiency;  the  lo¬ 
cating  of  factories  near  their  sources  of  raw  material;  and  particularly 
the  building  up  of  the  iron  and  steel  industries.  Under  such  a  program,  no 
considerable  overexpansion  of  industry  is  possible.  None  of  the  wastes 
of  competition  as  we  know  them  here  are  admissable — no  duplication  of 
plant  or  equipment,  no  cross  hauling,  no  competitive  advertising,  no  high- 

17 


pressure  salesmanship,  no  artificial  stimulation  of  wants,  no  trade  secrets 
— just  enough  shoe  factories  to  meet  the  needs  of  the  people  of  Russia 
for  shoes,  just  enough  textile  mills,  just  enough  sugar  plants. 

If  the  Gosplan  can  go  on  and  industry  can  keep  functioning  accord¬ 
ing  to  its  yardsticks,  we  are  going  to  have  some  day  a  great  laboratory, 
a  great  experiment  station,  in  which  we  can  finally  measure  the  utility 
to  mankind  of  a  collectivist  form  of  industry — a  laboratory  to  put  to 
naught  all  the  millions  of  words,  all  the  thousands  of  cubic  feet  of  hot 
air,  which  have  gone  into  the  discussion  of  socialism  versus  capitalism. 
If  the  Gosplan  can  carry  on,  we  will  know  in  five,  ten,  twenty  years, 
whether  any  such  coordination  is  possible  within  the  administrative  limits 
of  the  human  mind,  and,  if  so,  whether  it  makes  for  a  superior  sort  of 
economic  system  than  that  so  far  developed  by  the  Western  World.  As 
a  student  of  economic  experiments,  I  hope  with  all  my  heart  that  it  can 
go  on. 

And  so,  finally,  it  is  clear  to  me  from  my  month  in  Russia  that  it  is 
a  land  today  as  far  from  a  sink  of  degradation  and  stupidity  as  it  is 
from  a  Utopia. 

The  Chairman:  I  would  ask  you  all  to  start  getting  your  questions 
for  Mr.  Chase. 

Our  next  speaker  to  treat  with  Soviet  Russia  is  a  representative  of 
the  Catholic  Church — Professor  Walsh  of  Georgetown  University. 
Some  months  ago,  in  the  pursuit  of  my  profession,  I  happened 
to  take  a  special  train  from  one  of  the  seats  of  Protestant  Christianity, 
the  Archbishopric  at  Upsala,  down  to  Rome,  and  I  was  much  amused 
at  the  very  enthusiastic  interest  of  Protestants  and  Romanists  along  the 
borders  in  establishing  friendly  contact  with  Orthodox  Christians  in 
Russia.  At  Upsala  I  was  shown  a  picture  of  the  Archbishop  fishing  with 
one  of  the  Orthodox  patriarchs.  When  I  got  to  Rome  I  learned  that  they 
were  just  as  friendly  toward  them  down  there.  A  young  priest  told  me 
enthusiastically  that  as  many  as  two  thousand  monks  of  one  order  were 
waiting  to  go  in  to  help  Russia  when  the  time  came. 

It  is  a  great  pleasure  to  introduce  the  Reverend  Edmund  A.  Walsh, 
the  Director  General  of  the  Papal  Relief  Mission  to  Russia  in  1922. 
Father  Walsh! 

REV.  EDMUND  A.  WALSH 


MR.  CHAIRMAN,  Ladies  and  Gentlemen:  May  I  at  the  outset 
say  that  the  remarks  I  am  about  to  make  today  in  no  wise  repre¬ 
sent  any  official  policy  or  opinion  of  that  great  Christian  body  to  which 
our  Chairman  has  referred.  I  speak  to  you  today  solely  and  purely  in 
my  capacity  as  an  American  citizen. 

Ten  years  ago,  as  we  all  know,  the  Russian  Empire  crashed  to  irre¬ 
trievable  ruin,  because  by  all  the  laws  of  nature  its  disappearance  had  be¬ 
come  a  political  necessity.  The  Empire  of  the  Czars  was  the  last  island 

18 


stronghold  of  absolutism  in  the  rising  tide  of  democracy.  Ringed  round 
by  the  bayonets  of  the  Preobrajenski  and  Volynski  regiments,  its  ukases 
executed  by  the  knouts  of  the  Cossacks  and  the  flashing  sabres  of  Hus¬ 
sars,  it  had  defied  the  elements  for  three  hundred  years — until  the  red  de¬ 
luge  came.  Imperial  Russia  was  the  outstanding  anachronism  of  modern 
times  and  the  abuses  perpetrated  by  its  semi-Asiatic  government,  the  crass 
denial  of  fundamental  human  rights  and  the  exploitation  of  the  masses  by 
the  corrupt  and  inefficient  bureaucratic  caste  that  had  oppressed  its  pop¬ 
ulation  since  the  days  of  Peter  the  Great,  justified,  in  my  opinion,  a  dozen 
revolutions.  The  civilized  world  rejoiced  at  the  lifting  of  the  yoke,  and 
the  people  of  the  United  States  in  particular  stood  on  tiptoe  to  welcome 
Russia  into  the  family  of  free  nations.  Therefore  we  welcomed  that  rev¬ 
olution.  As  President  Wilson  put  it,  you  remember,  so  admirably  on 
the  floor  of  Congress,  on  that  eventful  day,  April  2,  1917,  “Here  is  a 
fit  partner  for  a  league  of  honor.” 

The  chronicling  of  that  revolution  we  may  well  leave  to  the  scientific 
historian.  Certain  practical  political  consequences  such  as  the  recognition 
of  the  new  Soviet  regime  concern  the  statesmen.  Mutual  recriminations 
and  hateful  charge  and  countercharge,  we  may  well  leave  to  the  propa¬ 
gandists,  white  and  red,  paid  and  unpaid.  Trade  possibilities  and  com¬ 
merce  will  fascinate  the  concessionaires.  But  the  basic  issue  belongs  to 
mankind;  it  belongs  to  you  and  to  me;  it  is  to  one  or  another  of  those 
basic  issues  that  I  beg  to  call  your  attention  at  this  time. 

We  must  remember  that  the  first  revolution,  that  of  March,  1917, 
which  resulted  in  a  constitutional  democracy,  is  not  the  revolution  which 
is  dominant  in  Russia  at  this  moment.  The  effects  of  the  democratic 
revolution  achieved  by  Miliukov,  Prince  Lvov  and  the  others  perished 
with  the  coming  of  the  Bolsheviks  on  November  7,  1917.  The  Russian 
revolution  with  which  we  are  now  concerned  was  not  revolution  in  the 
ordinarily  accepted  term;  it  did  not  mean  the  reallocation  of  sovereignty 
within  the  Russian  state, — which  is  the  definition  of  revolution, — but  it 
meant  the  beginning  of  an  enormous  transformation  of  the  whole  human 
race,  a  social  reorganization  which  was  not  to  stop  within  the  confines 
of  Soviet  Russia  but  to  spread  to  Europe,  to  America  and  to  every 
other  habitable  land.  It  proposed  to  create  a  new  arch-type  of  humanity, 
the  so-called  “collective  man,”  the  “mass  man,”  who  is  to  displace  for¬ 
ever  the  individual,  the  soul-encumbered  man. 

That  is  why  I  would  make  an  earnest  plea  for  very  clear  thinking  and 
clear  definition  of  terms  when  you  approach  the  great  problem  of  Russia. 
Because  of  the  lack  of  clear  thinking  and  because  of  the  lack  of  precise 
definition  of  terms,  there  has  been  a  great  deal  of  loose  talking,  a  great 
deal  of  misrepresentation,  and  a  great  deal  of  injustice  done  both  to  the 
Soviet  regime  and  to  those  of  us  who  take  the  freeman’s  liberty  of  differ¬ 
ing  from  its  program. 

I  have  a  striking  example  of  such  misrepresentation  before  me  today. 
There  has  recently  been  issued  a  report  by  a  group  of  Americans  who 

19 


went  to  Russia  during  the  summer, — an  unofficial  group,  I  am  told,  rep¬ 
resenting  the  trade  unions  of  the  United  States.  I  have  read  that  report 
with  great  care  and  attention,  with  the  care,  attention  and  respect  which 
any  opinion  of  my  countrymen  will  always  command  from  me.  After 
reading  it,  I  am  forced  to  the  conclusion  that  this  report, — particularly 
in  the  parts  that  concern  members  of  the  Foreign  Policy  Association,  in¬ 
terested  in  the  relations  of  Soviet  Russia  with  the  rest  of  the  world, — has 
been  written  by  men  of  a  high  type  of  intelligence,  intended  for  reading,  I 
should  say,  by  men  of  a  somewhat  limited  type  of  intelligence  and  of 
meager  information. 

This  report,  on  page  85,  repeats  the  charge  that  our  present  attitude  in 
refusing  to  recognize  Soviet  Russia  is  in  direct  contradiction  to  our  tradi¬ 
tional  policy  in  recognizing  revolutionary  governments.  Why,  are  we 
not  a  revolutionary  government  ourselves?  Therefore  we  should  be  the 
first  to  accept  the  friendship  of  new  revolutionary  governments !  And 
they  reproduce  on  that  page  the  historic  statesment  of  Thomas  Jefferson, 
which  says  that  we  cannot  deny  to  any  other  nation  the  right  to  make 
revolution,  and  to  govern  themselves  internally  as  they  see  fit.  It  is  one 
of  the  classical  loci  for  political  scientists.  Arguing  from  that  pronounce¬ 
ment,  the  report  concludes  with  a  vigorous  indictment  of  our  public  policy. 

Now,  the  statement  of  Mr.  Jefferson  is,  of  course,  true  and  sound 
American  policy.  But  there  is  one  other  thing,  one  other  requisite  for 
entering  into  political  relationship  with  the  Soviet  Government  which  Mr. 
Jefferson  does  not  here  mention  explicitly  because  he  understands  it, — 
because  it  was  so  commonly  accepted  among  the  nations  of  the  earth  that 
he  did  not  think  it  necessary  to  repeat  or  emphasize  it.  Recognition  of  a 
new  government  according  to  international  usage  demands  that  two  ele¬ 
ments,  two  conditions,  be  fulfilled : 

1.  That  the  government  in  question  be  in  actual,  de  facto,  con¬ 
trol  of  the  territory  in  question,  exercising  supreme  power 
and  performing  the  ordinary  functions  of  a  government. 

2.  That  it  have  the  ability  and  show  the  disposition  to  fulfill 
the  accepted  international  obligations  of  a  sovereign  power 
and  fulfill  its  responsibilities  as  a  member  of  the  family  of 
nations. 

The  accidental  fact  that  Jefferson,  in  this  particular  paragraph,  did  not 
mention  the  second  and  obvious  requisite  by  no  means  indicates  that  he 
did  not  presuppose  it.  If  you  are  invited  to  a  formal  function,  to  be  held 
sometime  before  noon,  and  if  the  invitation  states  that  top  hats  and  morn¬ 
ing  coats  should  be  worn,  does  that  mean  that  no  further  attire  is  re¬ 
quired?  A  decent  respect  for  the  common  opinion  of  mankind  provides 
for  the  other,  sine  qua  non.  Nay,  more.  Time  and  time  again 
the  government  of  the  United  States,  through  its  Presidents  and 
Secretaries  of  State,  has  explicitly  insisted  upon  this  second  requirement ; 
namely,  the  disposition  on  the  part  of  a  new  government  to  conform  to 

20 


standard  international  law.  I  have  before  me  a  collection  of  state  papers 
in  which  I  have  marked  and  segregated  seventeen  instances  in  which  this 
requirement  is  set  forth.  Time  would  not  permit  me  to  cite  more  than 
one  or  two.  Thus,  Mr.  Clay,  in  advocating  the  recognition  of  the  Re¬ 
public  of  Texas,  says,  “With  respect  to  new  powers  the  recognition  of 
their  governments  comprehends, — first,  an  acknowledgment  of  their  ability 
to  exist  as  independent  states  and  secondly,  a  capacity  of  their  particular 
governments  to  perform  the  duties  and  fulfill  the  obligations  towards  for¬ 
eign  powers  incident  to  their  new  condition” 

I  think  it  an  injustice  to  the  American  public  that  when  the  compilers 
of  this  Report  quoted  the  first  part  of  Mr.  Clay’s  statement,  which  they 
do  on  page  85,  that  they  did  not  proceed  seven  lines  more  and  quote  this 
second  statement  which  gives  the  integral  doctrine  of  the  United  States 
of  America.  It  required  no  certified  public  accountant  to  find  that  para¬ 
graph.  It  is  separated  by  only  seven  lines  from  the  first,  which  is  quoted 
in  this  Report  as  convincing  proof  of  American  policy. 

Moreover,  I  find  in  this  Report  a  continuation  of  such  misrepresenta¬ 
tion,  a  suppression  of  vital  fact  and  statements  of  half-truth  which  to 
me  is  incomprehensible.  In  the  few  moments  allowed  to  me  I  can  only 
quote  to  you  one  more  specimen. 

The  compilers  also  quote  in  this  Report  the  supposed  conditions  put 
down  for  the  recognition  of  Soviet  Russia  by  the  United  States.  On 
page  89  it  is  said  that  Mr.  Hughes,  in  his  note  of  December  21,  1923, 
insisted  upon  the  payment  of  Czarist  debts.  I  have  carefully  examined 
the  files  of  the  State  Department  for  five  years,  and  I  assure  you  there 
was  no  note  dated  December  21.  There  is  a  note  dated  December  18 
in  which  Mr.  Hughes  refers  to  the  conditions  already  put  down  by  the 
President  of  the  United  States  on  the  floor  of  Congress.  A  research  stu¬ 
dent  and  a  technical  adviser  would  ordinarily  betake  himself  to  the  state¬ 
ment  of  the  President  on  the  floor  of  Congress,  where  he  would  find  that 
in  his  address  to  the  assembled  Senators  and  Representatives  President 
Coolidge  insisted  on  the  recognition,  not  of  the  debts  contracted  by  the 
Czarist  regime,  but  of  the  debts  contracted  by  Revolutionary  Russia. 
The  Czarist  debts  are  explicitly  excluded. 

Injustice,  ladies  and  gentlemen,  if  I  have  read  history  aright,  arises 
from  one  of  two  causes, — either  from  ignorance  or  from  wilful  blind 
prejudice.  But,  when  I  read  the  list  of  men  who  participated  in  the 
compilation  of  this  report,  I  am  forbidden  from  their  character  and  train¬ 
ing  to  conclude  that  they  were  ignorant. 

Now,  the  reason  why  the  United  States  does  not  recognize  Soviet  Rus¬ 
sia  is  not  because  of  any  facts  alleged  in  this  Report.  It  is  because  the 
Soviets  have  refused  from  the  beginning  to  fulfill  the  second  require¬ 
ment  of  our  traditional  American  policy.  Their  repudiation  of  interna¬ 
tional  law,  which  has  been  formal,  dates  from  the  first  days  of  the  revo¬ 
lution;  it  was  declared  a  contemptible  bourgeois  code,  and  they  did  not 

21 


intend  to  abide  by  it.  Then  followed  actual  repudiation  of  all  their  obli¬ 
gations,  not  only  financial,  but  moral  and  legal,  culminating  in  the  erec¬ 
tion  of  an  instrumentality  designed  to  destroy  governments  in  other  parts 
of  the  world.  I  am  prepared  to  prove  to  you  that  the  erection  of  the 
Third  International  was  an  act  of  the  Soviet  Government,  done  in  the 
Kremlin,  the  official  Capitol  of  Soviet  Russia.  Do  not  these  things  con¬ 
stitute  a  refusal  to  abide  by  that  second  requisite? 

These  pronouncements  are  matters  of  public  record ;  they  are  not  the 
hotheaded  fulminations  of  irresponsible  members  of  the  Communist  Party, 
—but  the  express  statements  of  the  Soviet  Government  itself,  particularly 
in  its  written  constitution,  which  I  have  here  before  me.  We  know  that 
the  practical  execution  of  this  intention  to  set  the  world  on  fire  has 
formed  the  main  objective  of  their  foreign  policy  and  the  number  of  diplo¬ 
mats,  consular  agents  and  official  representatives  who  have  been  expelled 
from  various  countries,  because  of  their  unethical  and  hostile  activities, 
fills  a  long  page.  Senator  King  has  recorded  them  in  two  columns  of  the 
Congressional  Record  of  May  24,  1924.  And  we  know  that  within  the 
last  few  months  Great  Britain  has  been  obliged  to  sever  diplomatic  rela¬ 
tions  for  the  same  reason,  to  be  followed  by  a  similar  action  by  British 
Labor  Unions ;  and  Mr.  Rakovsky  was  forced  a  few  weeks  ago  to  steal 
secretly  out  of  Paris  in  order  to  save  himself  the  disgrace  of  actual  ex¬ 
pulsion  for  unwarranted  interference  in  the  internal  affairs  of  the 
French  Republic. 

Those  of  us  who  really  have  the  welfare  of  the  Russian  people  at  heart 
had  hoped  that  this  program  of  international  impertinence  was  gradually 
being  shelved  by  the  Soviet  Government  through  these  ten  years ;  but  un¬ 
happily  our  hopes  have  been  disappointed  and  the  present  ruler  of  Russia, 
Mr.  Stalin,  has  just  assured  us  from  Moscow,  on  the  occasion  of  the  Tenth 
Anniversary  of  the  Bolshevik  Revolution,  that  we  should  be  wrong  to 
conclude  that  the  hope  of  world  revolution  has  been  given  up  by  the 
Soviet  Government.  Within  the  last  two  weeks  he  issued  a  statement 
as  follows: 

“The  October  revolution  was  not  a  national  but  an  international  revo¬ 
lution— a  radical  change  in  the  history  of  humanity  from  the  old  capitalist 
world  to  a  new  socialist  world.  The  former  ‘great’  revolutions  in  England 
France  and  Germany  were  nothing  but  the  substitution  of  one  group  of 
exploiters  for  another— with  the  exception  of  the  heroic  though  unsuccess¬ 
ful  attempt  of  the  Paris  commune.  The  October  revolution  differs  from 
the  others  in  principle.” 

*  *  *  *  *  * 

“And  meanwhile  it  is  the  centre  and  the  base  of  the  revolutionary  move¬ 
ment,  prepared  to  take  advantage  of  the  revolutionary  situation  which  will 
inevitably  be  produced  by  capitalist  rivalries.  In  other  words,  we  children 
of  the  October  revolution  become  an  important  factor  in  world  affairs 
with  a  definite  specific  gravity. 

“The  era  of  capitalism’s  ruin  has  begun. 

22 


“Finally,  the  October  revolution  has  not  only  political  and  economic  im¬ 
portance  but  under  the  flag  of  Marxism,  Leninism  is  a  revolution  in  the 
thought  and  ideology  of  the  working  class. 

“Previously  Social  Democrats  might  talk  about  the  gradual  evolution  of 
socialism,  but  now  their  theory  is  proved  false — they  can  no  longer  mislead 
workers  who  have  the  example  of  our  proletarian  victory  before  their 
eyes.  Henceforth  the  World’s  Workers’  motto  is:  It  is  impossible  to  put 
an  end  to  capitalism  without  ending  social  democracy  in  the  workers’  move¬ 
ment.” 

We  had  hoped  that  the  tenth  anniversary  of  the  Revolution  might 
give  rise  to  some  assurance  that  this  sort  of  thing  was  all  over,  and  that 
they  would  do  what  friends  have  begged  and  prayed  them  to  do, — to 
be  reasonable.  They  may  do  what  they  please  on  their  own  territory 
but  they  must  not  attempt  either  by  official  statement  or  practice  to 
overturn  our  institutions  which  are  perfectly  pleasing  to  us. 

And  you  must  remember  that  when  Mr.  Voikoff  was  shot  at  Warsaw 
last  June, — I  happened  to  be  in  Europe  at  the  time, — the  next  day 
twenty  men  were  taken  out  in  Moscow  and  shot  without  trial,  as  an 
administrative  act  of  the  G.  P.  U.  The  things  that  terrify  are  not  seen 
in  the  street;  they  are  done  in  execution  chambers. 

Some  nations  protested  against  such  barbarity.  I  have  not  time, — be¬ 
cause  my  time  is  nearly  up, — to  read  to  you  the  official  answer  sent  to 
the  protest  of  one  country;  but  the  substance  was  this, — that  Soviet 
Russia  maintains  the  right  to  execute  without  trial  either  its  own  or  any 
other  nationals  who  go  into  its  territory;  that  the  G.  P.  U.,  which  is 
the  State  Political  Police,  the  successor  of  the  Cheka,  possesses  such 
power ;  and  that  all  foreigners,  who  go  there,  go  with  their  eyes  open  and 
must  submit  to  such  conditions.  The  fact  that  a  state  of  peace  existed 
between  Russia  and  Finland  (which  is  the  country  in  question)  did  not 
prevent  them  from  holding  General  Elkengren  as  a  precious  hostage  to 
be  executed  when  they  saw  fit. 

This  repudiation  of  all  international  usage  is  the  obstacle,  ladies  and 
gentlemen.  I  welcome,  as  does  every  visitor  to  Russia  and  every  friend 
of  peace  all  evidences  of  economic  rehabilitation,  but  I  maintain  they  do 
not  touch  the  heart  of  the  Russian  problem.  The  challenge  reaches  to 
the  basic  foundations  upon  which  our  civilization  rests. 

I  maintain,  therefore,  ladies  and  gentlemen,  that  the  situation  in  its 
basic  aspect  has  not  changed  a  particle.  As  the  other  speakers  have 
pointed  out,  there  have  been  great  and  hopeful  changes  in  the  economic 
situation,  but  in  the  political  claim  which  Soviet  Russia  presents  to  the 
world,  there  has  not  been  one  iota  of  change  from  the  platform  formu¬ 
lated  in  1917. 

In  conclusion,  I  must  also  protest  against  an  argument  I  have  heard 
from  a  hundred  platforms  in  the  last  two  years, — from  the  Atlantic  to 
the  Pacific  and  down  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  I  have  often  heard  the 
impassioned  statement  that  our  present  attitude  means  that  we  are  re- 

23 


fusing  to  recognize  the  Russian  people.  That  is  another  example  of 
loose  talk.  States  do  not  recognize  peoples.  Governments  recognize 
other  governments.  The  Russian  people  no  more  need  recognition 
than  does  the  sun  in  the  heavens  or  any  other  obvious  fact.  They  exist, 
and  existed  long  before  we  did.  There  were  republics  at  Pskov  and 
Novgorod  six  hundred  years  before  the  Mayflower  set  sail.  Our  recog¬ 
nition  of  the  Russian  people  was  given  in  1922  and  1923  by  the  Ameri¬ 
can  people  under  the  distinguished  leadership  of  General  Haskell  in  a 
way  that  wrote  the  best  page  that  I  know  of  in  our  international  relations. 

I  feel  sure,  Mr.  Chairman,  that  I  may  end  by  believing  that  it  is  the 
wish,  the  hope,  and  the  prayer  of  everyone  in  this  hall  today  that  the  mo¬ 
ment  is  not  far  off  when  we  can  stretch  out  that  same  hand  again  for  the 
economic  rehabilitation  of  that  great  land  and  that  noble  race.  But  such 
cooperation,  when  it  comes,  must  come  on  a  basis  of  mutual  respect, — * 
respect  for  each  other,  respect  for  international  law,  respect  for  the 
natural,  inalienable  rights  of  man,  and  respect  for  the  fundamental 
postulates  of  the  divine  law,  because,  does  not  history  teach  us  that 
where  law  ends  injustice  and  tyranny  begin?  I  thank  you! 

The  Chairman:  Mr.  Chase  has  asked  permission  to  say  one  or  two 
words  anent  Father  Walsh. 

Mr.  Chase:  I  just  wanted  to  clear  up  a  slight  misinterpretation. 
The  question  of  recognition  is  included  at  the  end  of  the  report  of  the 
unofficial  American  labor  delegation  to  Russia.  That  particular  section 
was  written  coming  back  on  the  Leviathan  by  members  of  the  labor 
group.  A  number  of  the  so-called  experts,  of  whom  I  happen  to  be 
one  and  Professor  Tugwell  there  was  another,  voted  against  inclusion 
in  the  report  of  any  section  on  recognition.  We  felt  it  would  be  stronger 
to  give  the  facts  and  let  the  American  people  decide  whether  they 
wanted  to  recognize  Russia  or  not.  This  section,  accordingly,  I  had 
nothing  whatsoever  to  do  with,  and  the  report  itself  is  signed  by  James 
H.  Mowrer,  John  Brophy,  Frank  L.  Palmer,  and  Albert  F.  Coyle.  The 
group  of  experts  did  not  sign  the  report,  but  are  going  to  publish  their 
own  signed  reports  in  the  near  future. 

The  Chairman  :  In  other  words,  ladies  and  gentlemen,  this  particular 
report  has  affixed  to  it  neither  an  “N-o”  nor  a  “C.  P.  A.” 

Mr.  Colt  :  Although  the  Communist  Party  still  forms  a  small  minor¬ 
ity  of  the  Russian  people,  is  it  not  a  very  much  larger  number  than  the 
original  estimate  of  six  hundred  thousand? 

Mr.  Chase:  One  million  two  hundred  thousand. 

The  Chairman:  C.  P.  A! 

Question  :  I  have  seen  a  report  which  stated  officially  that  there 
were  one  million  six  hundred  unemployed  in  Russia  on  September  30, 
1927.  Are  those  figures  correct  ? 


24 


Mr.  Chase:  Those  are  just  about  the  figures  that  I  got  when  I  was 
there  in  August, — one  million  six  hundred  thousand  officially  out  of  work. 
Did  you  ask  me  how  I  would  improve  it? 

Question  :  I  have  such  respect  for  your  ability  that  I  think  you 
would  be  able  to  improve  it,  but  I  should  like  to  know  what  the  reason 
is  for  that  industrial  situation. 

Mr.  Chase:  The  reasons  are  two.  First,  the  influx  of  peasants  into 
the  cities  and  towns,  particularly  into  Moscow;  secondly,  the  fact  that 
“rationalization,”  as  they  call  the  efficiency  movement  in  industry,  is 
continually  throwing  people  out  of  work.  As  they  improve  their  output 
per  man  hour  (and  as  they  have  not  sufficient  capital  to  take  up  the  slack), 
they  constantly  drop  men  from  their  factories  and  from  other  bureaus. 
While  we  were  in  Moscow  they  put  in  a  pneumatic  system  in  the  Post 
Office  and  dropped  one  hundred  messengers. 

Now,  they  face  the  fact.  But  they  say  it  is  more  important  in  the 
long  run  to  go  on  improving  industrial  output  and  in  the  meantime  to 
do  what  they  can  with  unemployment  doles  and  other  schemes.  They 
are  trying  to  place  these  straying  peasants  back  on  the  farms  here  and 
there.  But  the  officials  to  whom  we  talked,  the  men  at  the  heads  of  the 
bureaus,  do  not  hesitate  to  affirm  that  unemployment  is  a  serious  prob¬ 
lem,  and  that  there  is  no  solution  for  it  for  a  number  of  years  to  come. 

One  interesting  fact,  which  may  throw  a  sidelight  on  their  statistical 
ability,  is  that,  beginning  about  five  years  from  now,  the  generation 
whose  fathers  and  mothers  suffered  most  severely  during  the  war  and 
the  civil  war,  will  come  into  industry.  That  generation  of  youngsters 
is  about  five  million  less  than  the  ordinary  generation,  and  they  look  to 
that  to  help  their  unemployment  situation  considerably.  But  it  is  going 
to  take  a  long,  long  time,  gathering  capital  internally,  before  they  are 
going  to  have  sufficient  to  put  everybody  to  work. 

Mr.  Jones:  In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  Russian  Government  has 
decided  to  send  a  representative  to  join  in  the  discussion  at  Geneva  on 
disarmament,  at  the  Preparatory  Commission,  may  I  ask  Mr.  McDonald 
whether  he  would  regard  that  as  an  indication  of  a  change  of  attitude 
on  the  part  of  Russia  toward  the  League  of  Nations? 

Mr.  McDonald:  The  official  attitude  in  Russia,  as  I  understand  it, 
towards  the  League  of  Nations  has  been  that  the  League  is  a  bourgeois 
contraption,  destined  to  perpetuate  a  fast-failing  capitalism.  I  think  the 
Communist  officials  have  realized  that  the  League  is  more  than  that,  and 
probably  in  good  faith  are  going  to  the  Geneva  Preparatory  Conference 
to  see  what  can  be  done  about  disarmament.  I  doubt,  however,  if  it 
indicates  more  than  a  recognition  that  the  League  has  come  to  stay.  It 
probably  does  not  indicate  that  the  Soviet  authorities  have  changed  their 
idea  as  to  the  fundamental  character  of  the  League. 

25 


Professor  Borodin  :  I  would  like  to  have  Mr.  Chase  tell  us  the 
comparative  prices  in  Russia  now  and  in  1913  for  one  yard  of  cotton 
fabric  in  dollars  and  cents,  one  pair  of  shoes,  and  one  pound  of  sugar. 

Mr.  Chase:  Frankly,  I  don’t  remember  them.  Do  you,  Professor 
Tugwell?  What  is  the  range? 

Professor  Tugwell:  The  indexes  for  prices  seem  to  show  that 
prices  in  Russia,  curiously  enough,  are  very  much  higher  than  they  are 
in  the  rest  of  the  world,  considerably  higher,  probably  twenty-five  per 
cent  higher,  for  these  common  ordinary  things  which  are  spoken  of. 
On  the  other  hand,  wages  are  somewhat  higher,  proportionately,  not 
compared  with  our  wages,  but  compared  with  what  they  were  before, 
if  you  understand  me.  So  that  the  ability  to  buy,  the  purchasing  power 
of  wages  in  Russia,  is  higher  now  than  it  was  before  the  war  by  some 
forty  per  cent,  I  estimate.  Professor  Douglas  thinks  it  is  somewhat  more. 

But  this  of  course  refers  to  only  a  very  small  part  of  the  population. 
The  peasant’s  purchasing  power  is  probably  somewhat  less  than  it  was 
before  the  war,  or  at  any  rate  down  until  1921.  But  the  situation  has 
measurably  improved  in  the  last  two  years,  and  I  think  there  is  every 
reason  to  believe  that  the  Soviets  are  doing  more  to  close  the  scissors, 
as  it  is  called,  than  any  other  country  in  the  world. 

Professor  Borodin  :  May  I  quote  some  figures  which  I  have  for 
that?  There  has  been  no  answer  to  my  question.  I  have  some  figures 
for  the  present  time,  and  I  know  what  the  prices  were  before.  In 
Moscow,  fabric  costs  about  $2.40  a  yard — just  cotton  fabric.  Wool  costs 
$35  a  yard.  Boots  cost  $50  a  pair.  Shoes  cost  $40  a  pair.  Sugar  is 
$3  a  pound.  That  is  not  in  state  stores,  but  just  common  stores  where 
they  used  to  buy  these  things  before  for  one-tenth  of  these  figures 
which  I  quote.  I  know  what  it  cost  in  1913  because  I  lived  there  at  that 
time. 

The  Chairman  :  Sugar  at  $3  a  pound — something  for  the  housewife ! 

Colonel  Cooper:  I  have  been  in  Russia  for  six  months  of  the  last 
year,  and  if  my  good  friend,  the  last  speaker,  would  know  the  facts, 
I  can  tell  him  those  figures  are  all  desperately  wrong. 

Professor  Borodin  :  They  are  taken  from  official  sources. 

Mr.  Briggs:  Father  Walsh,  I  should  like  to  know  whether  in  your 
mention  of  Secretary  Hughes’  statement  about  not  recognizing  Russia, 
because  it  does  not  recognize  international  law,  you  would  imply  that 
the  other  countries  who  have  recognized  Russia  do  admit  that  Russia 
recognizes  international  law. 

Father  Walsh  :  The  reasons  which  induced  many  European  nations 
to  recognize  Soviet  Russia  were  largely  economic.  The  pressure  through 
which  they  were  going,  the  fall  in  productivity,  the  unemployment  in  their 

26 


countries,  and  a  great  many  other  such  reasons  induced  them  to  waive, 
to  minimize  and  allow  to  go  by  the  board  a  great  many  things  which  the 
United  States,  because  of  our  isolation,  because  of  being  six  thousand 
miles  away,  insists  upon  because  of  the  important  principles  involved. 

Of  those  nations  that  did  recognize  Soviet  Russia,  pretty  nearly  every 
one  inserted  into  the  treaty  a  clause  which  practically  said,  “We  know 
that  you  are  liable  to  do  things  within  our  country  that  are  forbidden  by 
international  law,  and  we  require  of  you  ahead  of  time  a  guarantee  that 
you  won’t  do  them.” 

If  you  will  read  the  various  treaties,  beginning  with  the  earliest  ones 
with  Finland  and  Latvia  and  the  other  Border  States,  with  Poland  and 
Austria  and  finally  Great  Britain,  you  will  find  such  paragraphs  in  practi¬ 
cally  every  one.  It  was  because  of  the  violation  of  those  specific  para¬ 
graphs  that  nearly  two  pages  of  names  may  be  found  of  Soviet  repre¬ 
sentatives  who  were  expelled  by  different  nations.  Finally,  the  British 
were  obliged  to  break  entirely. 

Mr.  Linton  Wells:  It  was  my  good  fortune  to  know  something 
about  the  Japanese  recognition  of  Russia.  I  know  that  Harry  F.  Sinclair 
lost  his  properties  through  a  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Soviet 
Russia,  on  condition  that  the  oil  fields  which  he  owned  would  be  given 
to  the  Japanese  Government  in  return  for  recognition.  I  happen  to 
know  that  to  be  an  absolute  fact. 

Question  :  What  are  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  recogni¬ 
tion,  Mr.  McDonald? 

The  Chairman  :  Mr.  McDonald  does  not  have  to  answer  that. 

Mr.  McDonald:  I  think  that  I  ought  to  relapse  into  my  traditional 
role  of  chairman  for  the  moment  for  two  reasons — first,  because  of  the 
difficulty  of  the  question,  and  second,  because  of  the  element  of  time. 
The  question  would  involve  taking  not  only  the  half  minute  which  is 
left  but  much,  much  more  time  than  is  left  between  now  and  four  o’clock. 

Major  General  Haskell:  I  would  like  to  ask  one  question.  It 
has  been  stated  this  afternoon  that  a  Russian  workman  is  better  off  today 
than  he  was  in  1913,  and  in  coming  to  that  conclusion  I  think  that  the 
speaker  has  included  a  great  many  allowances,  matters  of  insurance, 
vacations,  free  tickets  to  the  theater,  various  other  things.  I  would  like 
to  know  how  much  weight  those  things  are  given  in  this  estimate  and  I 
would  like  to  know  whether  they  get  them  or  not. 

Mr.  Chase:  I  did  not  study  that  particular  problem.  I  only  talked 
with  Paul  Douglas,  as  he  was  studying  it,  and,  as  I  remember  it,  he 
worked  out  an  increase  in  real  wages  over  1913  of  ten  per  cent,  and  then 
he  added  these  considerations  of  vacation,  of  unemployment  insurance, 
of  old  age  pensions,  and  so  forth,  which  brought  his  total  up  to  a  thirty- 
five  per  cent  increase  or  thereabouts. 

27 


I  am  convinced  from  all  I  saw  and  all  I  heard  that  the  Russian  worker 
today,  that  is,  this  rather  small  group  of  industrial  workers,  is  getting 
that  social  insurance.  Two  years  ago  it  was  mostly  on  paper.  Today  it 
is  being  given  to  him  in  hard,  material  considerations. 

The  Chairman:  Father  Walsh  will  say  a  word. 

Father  Walsh  :  I  think  I  may  take  the  liberty  of  substantiating  to 
a  certain  extent  Mr.  Chase’s  conclusions,  but,  with  his  permission,  under 
considerable  reservation. 

Viewed  in  the  large,  the  benefits  of  the  Bolshevik  revolution  has  been 
concentrated,  by  the  very  philosophy  of  Marxism,  on  a  very,  very  small 
minority.  It  is  the  urban  proletariat, — namely,  the  city  workers, — who 
have  received  the  chief  benefits.  Let  us  say  there  are  three  million  urban 
proletariat  laborers.  In  a  population  of  one  hundred  and  forty  million 
people,  these,  I  think, — from  observations  of  nearly  two  years, —  have 
been  benefited.  But  what  of  the  one  hundred  and  thirty-seven  million 
left? 

Question  :  I  should  like  to  ask  Mr.  Chase  from  what  sources  he 
obtained  his  information  regarding  the  increased  industrial  and  agricul¬ 
tural  output  of  Russia  and  if  he  is  very  certain  that  his  figures  are 
correct  ? 

Mr.  Chase:  I  obtained  them  from  the  Gosplan,  checked  by  the 
figures  of  the  Supreme  Economic  Council,  checked  by  the  figures  of  the 
Conjunction  Institute.  Professor  Tugwell  and  I  spent  a  great  deal  of 
time  going  into  the  methodology  of  their  statistics.  We  found,  for  in¬ 
stance,  that  their  crop  and  agricultural  statistics  were  based 
upon  a  ten  per  cent  survey  in  the  spring.  They  were  then  checked  by 
three  coefficients  of  correction  ending  with  an  airplane  photographic  sur¬ 
vey  of  the  lands. 

The  Soviet  Government  functions — it  has  got  to  function — on  a 
statistical  basis,  and  if  those  figures  are  wrong,  they  are  ditched.  The 
figures  were  wrong,  grievously  wrong,  for  the  first  five  or  six  years, 
until  they  determined  that  they  had  to  improve  the  quality  of  their 
statistics,  and  their  best  technical  brains  have  been  going  into  improving 
the  quality  and  character  of  their  statistics,  until  the  control  figures 
now  are,  within  limits,  I  am  convinced, — though  I  may  be  wrong — 
reasonably  correct. 

Question  :  There  are  a  certain  number  of  peasants,  there  are  a 
certain  number  of  proletarians.  I  want  to  know  the  number,  roughly, 
of  people  who  are  subject  to  the  terror, — the  people  who  have  been  de¬ 
fined  as  like  ourselves,  former  business  people,  lawyers,  and  people  of 
that  class, — how  many  are  there  that  are  subject  to  this  terror? 

The  Chairman:  Father  Chase!  (Walsh!) 

28 


Father  Walsh  :  Just  retribution !  I  should  venture  to  say  that  the 
terror,  as  an  instrument  of  political  extermination  of  an  opposing  class, 
— which  it  was, — was  confined  to  three  categories.  First,  the  members 
of  the  old  regime,  monarchists,  members  of  the  grand  dukes’  families, 
certain  cabinet  members  of  the  Czar,  and  so  on.  Secondly,  a  certain 
number  of  the  bourgeoisie,  that  is,  the  burgess  class,  which  was,  maybe, 
fourteen  to  fifteen  per  cent  of  the  Russian  population  at  the  outbreak 
of  the  revolution.  Then  also  the  clergy.  Thirdly,  at  least  after  the 
revolution,  after  the  successful  establishmment  of  Bolshevik  power,  the 
SR’s,  the  Social  Revolutionaries,  men  of  revolutionary  tendencies  but 
who  wanted  to  bring  about  revolution,  not  by  bullets,  but  by  ballots. 

I  should  say,  then,  that  the  terror  afifected  a  group  which  in  the  large 
was  perhaps  fourteen  to  fifteen  per  cent  of  the  population.  Out  of  that 
fourteen  to  fifteen  per  cent  of  the  population,  I  think  the  figures  will 
show  that  one  million  eight  hundred  thousand  people  were  executed  by 
the  Cheka. 

Question:  How  many  are  left  now  of  this  class? 

Father  Walsh  :  The  gentleman  calls  for  an  estimate  of  what  we 
call  the  middle  class  in  Russia.  That  is  very  hard  to  ascertain,  because 
at  the  outbreak  of  the  revolution  great  numbers  of  them, — professors, 
doctors,  and  those  generally  described  as  members  of  the  intelligentsia, — • 
were  obliged  to  flee  from  Russia.  Those  who  came  back  afterwards  are 
now  very  highly  prized,  if  they  conform  to  the  regime. 

I  believe  the  figures  are  tabulated, — and  I  have  them, — of  the  number 
of  doctors  executed,  lawyers  executed,  and  so  on. 

Question:  How  many  are  there  left? 

Father  Walsh  :  Russia,  sir,  was  one-sixth  of  the  area  of  the  earth. 
I  suppose,  to  hazard  a  guess — which  is  all  it  would  be — you  might  say 
from  two  to  three  million  of  that  group.  That  is  purely  a  guess,  in  view 
of  the  enormous  extent  of  that  problem. 

The  Chairman:  Are  there  any  more  brief  and  snappy  questions? 

Major  General  Haskell:  This  is  not  a  brief  question  nor  snappy, 
but  the  greatest  indication  that  I  have  heard  here  today  as  to  the  progress 
of  Soviet  Russia  is  that  they  are  now  able  to  give  correct  statistics. 

I  spent  some  two  or  three  years  in  Russia  and  had  a  great  many  deal¬ 
ings,  and  I  will  give  you  an  indication  of  what  statistics  are  worth. 
I  called  upon  Kamenev,  who  was  then  the  head  of  the  organization  to 
take  care  of  the  aftermath  of  the  famine,  for  statistics  on  the  crops. 
He  wanted  to  show  that  Soviet  Russia  could  not  export  grain,  so  we 
got  one  set  of  statistics.  I  objected  to  those  as  incorrect.  At  the 
same  time  another  department  of  the  Government  was  trying  to  get  a 
loan  in  America.  The  Foreign  Trade  Department  was  anxious  to  ex¬ 
port.  I  got  my  second  set  of  statistics  from  them.  They  varied  twenty- 

29 


five  per  cent  from  the  first  ones  upon  the  crops  in  Russia.  Finally  from 
the  Statistical  Bureau  we  got  another  set,  and  none  of  them  were  within 
ten  per  cent  of  each  other.  And  from  our  own  information  they  were 
all  altogether  wrong. 

There  is  absolutely  no  possibility — or  there  was  none  two  or  three  years 
ago — of  depending  on  any  statistics  that  you  get  from  any  department 
of  the  Soviet  Government.  I  know  that  because  I  did  business  with 
them. 

With  that  in  view,  they  talk  about  vacations  and  insurance  and  doles. 
I  had  one  hundred  and  twenty-five  thousand  people  on  my  payroll.  They 
were  Russians.  It  was  the  obligation  of  the  Russian  Government  to 
feed  those  people,  and  they  were  sometimes  a  month,  sometimes  six 
weeks,  sometimes  eight  weeks  behind  in  the  delivery  of  food  to  keep 
themselves  alive.  It  got  so  bad  finally  that  the  American  Relief  Admin¬ 
istration  fed  the  people  who  were  working  for  them  and  cared  no  more 
and  tried  no  more  to  get  them  to  pass  out  this  food  in  the  time  of  famine 
which  it  was  the  obligation  of  the  Government  to  produce.  It  was  not 
because  they  did  not  want  to  do  it.  It  was  not  because  they  were  unwilling 
to  do  it.  But  it  was  because  they  were  unable  to  do  it.  There  was 
no  criticism  of  their  sincerity.  The  criticism  was  of  their  ability  to  do 
these  things  and  their  inability  to  conform  to  that  sort  of  obligation, 
and,  if  I  am  not  mistaken  in  my  estimate,  even  though  the  workers’ 
condition  may  be  better,  they  are  not  conforming  one  hundred  per  cent 
to  these  obligations  of  theirs  today  any  more  than  they  were  in  1923  or 
1925.  But  they  have  gotten  into  the  situation  where  their  statistics  are 
better  coordinated  than  they  were  in  1923. 

Father  Walsh  :  The  Chairman  has  allowed  me  one  brief  moment  to 
throw  into  the  discussion,  as  an  illustrative  example,  something  about 
statistics.  Possibly  General  Haskell  will  remember  this  incident,  too. 
On  one  occasion,  some  of  his  officials  were  called  to  the  Kremlin  and 
shown  certain  statistics  to  prove  that  the  overhead  operations  of  the 
American  Relief  Administration  were  so  heavy  that  the  expenses  did 
not  warrant  the  contribution.  They  showed  a  set  of  figures  which  proved 
that  the  overhead  expense  of  the  American  Relief  Administration  was 
thirty  per  cent  of  the  value  of  the  articles  contributed! 

One  of  General  Haskell’s  subordinates,  knowing  that  it  could  not  be 
true,  went  over  the  statistics,  and  found  that  they  were  three  per  cent. 
The  Soviet  gentleman  who  proposed  the  difficulty  merely  smiled  and  said, 
“Oh,  a  decimal  point  has  slipped !” 

Question  :  I  should  like  to  ask  if  Mr.  McDonald  or  Mr.  Chase  would 
give  a  brief  definition  of  Communism. 

The  Chairman:  Will  Mr.  McDonald  or  Mr.  Chase  give  a  brief 
definition  of  Communism? 


30 


Mr.  McDonald  :  Stuart  Chase  says  that  he  does  not  know  and  cannot. 
Well,  I  do  not  know  a  definite,  final  definition  of  Communism  either. 
But  what  Communism  means  to  me  is  Socialism  revolutionized  or  made 
revolutionary.  It  is  probably  more  than  that,  but  it  means  an  attempt 
on  the  part  of  the  governing  class  to  have  a  socialistic  control  of  all  of 
the  sources  of  production.  It  means  the  adoption  of  the  Marxian 
theory.  But  there  is  a  vast  difference  between  Socialism  as  my  namesake 
in  England — Ramsay  MacDonald — stands  for  it,  and  Socialism  as  they 
mean  it  in  Russia.  I  have  always  thought  that  the  basic  difference  between 
Communism  and  Socialism — though  this  is  possibly  only  an  ignorant 
person’s  judgment — is  that  the  Communists  have  established  a  theory 
that  it  should  be  imposed  by  revolution,  maintained  if  necessary  by  the 
dictatorship  of  the  proletariat,  a  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat  maintained 
by  whatever  means  may  be  necessary  to  that  end.  Then,  if  you  get  into 
the  field  of  Bolshevism,  you  have  all  sorts  of  philosophical  concepts,  for 
an  understanding  of  which  I  refer  you  to  an  extremely  interesting, 
erudite  and  heavy  volume  called  “The  Mind  and  Face  of  Bolshevism.” 

Dr.  Ingerman  :  Through  what  means  is  the  productivity  of  labor 
increased  in  Russia? 

Mr.  Chase  :  By  the  slow  infiltration  of  our  American  ideas  of  scien¬ 
tific  management,  of  straight-line  production,  of  conveyor  systems,  of 
all  the  ways  and  means  by  which  we  increase  our  own  technical  effici¬ 
ency  here.  The  Russian,  heaven  knows,  is  no  Yankee;  it  takes  him 
much  longer  and  he  has  a  much  thicker  head  in  getting  used  to  these 
methods.  But  he  is  doing  the  best  he  can,  and  his  output  per  man  per 
hour  is  steadily  increasing. 

There  is  also  a  very  interesting  committee  of  the  local  trade  union  in 
each  factory,  a  production  committee,  which  is  keenly  interested  in 
cooperating  with  the  management  in  pointing  out  ways  and  means  for 
cutting  down  waste  and  leakage  and  loss.  There  is  a  widespread  series 
of  premiums  and  bonuses  whereby  any  individual  who  devises  a  new 
invention  or  a  new  way  of  cheapening  production  is  rewarded  and 
honored.  I  mean,  all  available  incentives  are  used,  including  financial 
ones,  within  limits,  to  encourage  both  management  and  men  to  increase 
their  production.  As  contrasted  with  Russia’s  old  level,  it  is  a  phe¬ 
nomenal  increase;  as  contrasted  with  the  American  level,  it  is  very  little. 


31 


/ 


THE  RESEARCH  DEPARTMENT 

Of  the  Foreign  Policy  Association 

Raymond  Leslie  Buell,  Ph.  D.,  Director 

Formerly  Assistant  Professor  of  Government,  Harvard  University 

Information  Service 

Whether  the  question  of  the  hour  is  Russia,  Italy,  China  or  Nic¬ 
aragua,  the  facts  can  be  found  accurately  and  impartially  presented 
in  the  fortnightly  reports  of  the  F.  P.  A.  Information  Service . 

Used  by  more  than  700  editors,  65  national  organizations,  400 
college  professors,  and  1,900  F.  P.  A.  members. 

Recent  Issues  Include: 

DEVELOPMENTS  IN  RUSSIA’S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS 
THE  EVOLUTION  OF  THE  SOVIET  GOVERNMENT, 
1917-1927 

THE  RUSSIAN  ECONOMIC  SITUATION 
THE  FRANCO-AMERICAN  TARIFF  DISPUTE 
PAN-AMERICANISM  AND  THE  PAN-AMERICAN 
CONFERENCES 

THE  PROBLEM  OF  AN  AUSTRO-GERMAN  UNION 

Special  Supplementary  Studies: 

THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  WAR  DEBTS 
FOREIGN  INVESTMENTS  IN  GERMANY 
AMERICA,  THE  WORLD’S  BANKER 

Subscription  Rates: 

F.  P.  A.  Members  ------  $3.00 

Non-Members  -  $5.00 

(Membership  dues  $5.00  a  year.) 

(Subscribers  receive  twenty-six  Reports  a  year  together  with  the 

Special  Supplements.) 

Further  Information  on  Request 

Foreign  Policy  Association 

NATIONAL  HEADQUARTERS 

18  East  41st  Street  New  York  City 


